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
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18 CHCSFCR
⑥ AGDA-A (M) (30 Aug 71) FOR OT-UT-711180

22 September 1971

SUBJECT: ~~Q~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, ~~XXIV~~
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⑨ Operational Rpt. for period ending 30 Apr 71.

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

11 17 May 71

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

12 87b.
Verne L. Bowers

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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17 May 1971

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
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17 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20320

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command and Organization.

(1) Command: On 23 November 1970 Major General James L. Baldwin, Deputy Commanding General, departed for reassignment as Commanding General, 23d Infantry Division, and Major General Albert E. Milloy assumed duty as Deputy Commanding General.

(2) Organization:

(a) Company C, 5th Special Forces was released from OPCON, XXIV Corps on 31 December 1970.

(b) The 27th Artillery Detachment (Radar) was assigned to XXIV Corps and further attached to XXIV Corps Artillery on 1 March 1971.

b. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) General Enemy Situation.

(a) Summary: Enemy initiated actions have been characterized as attacks by fire, sapper attacks, ground probes, and terrorist activities. These actions were concentrated during periods of increased activity or highpoints timed to coincide with periods of lowest lunar illumination. Simultaneous with these actions, the enemy continued efforts to develop base areas, increase his supply level, improve his lines of communication (LOC), and move men and supplies eastward toward the lowlands.

(b) Quang Tri Province.

1 Early in the reporting period in Quang Tri Province enemy activity was characterized by attacks by fire on Allied fire support bases south

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of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The enemy employed rocket teams of the 84th Artillery Regiment and mortar crews from the 27th and 270th Infantry Regiments to deliver these fires. The only major ground contact reported early in the period occurred northeast of Con Thien when Allied Forces engaged the 4th Battalion, 270th Infantry Regiment.

2 Indications of an enemy buildup north of the DMZ were evidenced as early as December 1970. Agent reports alluded to reinforcement of B-5 Front elements in preparation for an anticipated Allied Force invasion of North Vietnam. The B-5 Front is a North Vietnamese Army Corps type organization responsible for defense of the DMZ area. These reports identified a newly formed 3d North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division which was reported to have moved south into an area north of the eastern DMZ. Agent reports also indicated the presence of 130mm and 152mm field artillery pieces north of the central DMZ on 13 February 1971.

3 In late January and early February 1971, one battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment, the 15th Engineer Battalion, and the 33d Sapper Battalion moved south of the central DMZ to conduct operations against Allied Forces engaged in Lam Son 719. Supported by elements of the 84th Artillery Regiment, these forces conducted attacks by fire on Fire Support Base (FSB) Fuller and FSB Vandegrift, engaged Allied Forces northwest of the Rockpile, and struck convoys traveling along Route QL-9 between Vandegrift and Khe Sanh.

4 In western Quang Tri Province during this same period, Allied Forces intercepted elements of the 88th Infantry Regiment, 308th Division attempting to infiltrate the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) from Laos. A prisoner of war taken in this contact stated the 88th Infantry Regiment had the mission of attacking Khe Sanh; however, due to enemy losses suffered in this engagement, the 88th Infantry Regiment was unable to complete its mission. Enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks against Allied fire support bases, troop locations, and installations in western Quang Tri Province increased as enemy strength increased just west of the province border with Laos.

5 South of the eastern DMZ, elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment remained active throughout the period as they continued to emplace water mines in the Cua Viet River. In late February and during March 1971, the sapper regiment began a concentrated effort to interdict the flow of supplies along the Cua Viet River. During this period, 28 water mining incidents occurred on this major water LCC resulting in three ships sunk and one barge damaged.

(c) Thua Thien Province.

1 Early in the reporting period in eastern Thua Thien Province the

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enemy conducted attacks by fire on isolated outposts and lucrative installations while attempting to infiltrate personnel into the coastal lowlands. The enemy was also engaged in bolstering the level of his supplies in preparation for future operations.

2 As the first of the year approached and continuing throughout the reporting period, the enemy in eastern Thua Thien Province employed economy of force tactics. Enemy actions during this period consisted of rocket attacks against Camp Evans, Hue City, and the Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) training center at Dong Ha.

3 In the southern portion of the province during the latter part of this period, the enemy increased his actions by intensifying his attacks against the Hue-to-Da Nang Railroad and by attempting to interdict Highway QL-9.

4 The 29th and 803d Infantry Regiments of the 324B Division and the 6th Infantry Battalion of Military Region Tri Thien Hue, (The enemy headquarters responsible for operations in southern Quang Tri Province and all of Thua Thien Province) were involved in the attacks against FSB O'Reilly in the latter portion of the last reporting period. During the early portion of this report period these forces withdrew to the west after suffering heavy losses from Allied Forces ground operations, tactical air strikes, and B-52 bombing strikes. The 324B Division elements remained in the vicinity of the eastern portion of Base Area 611 in Laos conducting refitting, retraining, and resupply activities until they were committed to counterattack the ARVN cross-border operations in Laos.

(d) Quang Nam Province.

1 A combination of friendly operations and early November flooding resulted in a low level of activity in Quang Nam Province early in the reporting period. The level remained low throughout January 1971, as the enemy attempted to solve his food shortages and to prepare for increased offensive actions following the TET holiday. Sapper attacks, attacks by fire, and terrorism accounted for most of the enemy initiated activity during this time frame.

2 Early February 1971 brought increased enemy initiated activity as his K-800 Campaign commenced. Periods of increased enemy actions or highpoints were timed to coincide with periods of lowest lunar illumination.

3 During Phase I of the K-800 Campaign, Da Nang Air Base was rocketed by elements of the 575th Rocket Artillery Battalion. Additionally, several attacks by fire and ground attacks were conducted against Allied Forces outposts and installations throughout the province.

4 The beginning of Phase II was marked by another attack on Da Nang

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Air Base. As Phase II progressed enemy activity became less intense and more sporadic.

5 Following Phase II the enemy employed guerilla tactics in attacks against Duc Duc District Headquarters and Duc Duc Village. Commencing on 29 March 1971, major elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment and two sapper battalions conducted combined mortar and sapper attacks against these installations that resulted in over 100 civilians and Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) soldiers killed, over 150 wounded, and over 1500 houses destroyed or damaged.

6 A final significant attack by fire was directed against Da Nang Air Base on 27 April 1971 resulting in the loss of 175,505 gallons of JP-4, 325,000 gallons of aviation gas, and one fuel storage tank.

(e) Quang Tin Province.

1 Quang Tin Province was again relatively quiet during the early portion of the reporting period as the enemy avoided major contact with Allied Forces and concentrated his efforts toward resupply activities.

2 By the first of January 1971, the enemy had begun preparations for future highpoints consisting of attacks by fire on isolated Allied Force outposts and installations. Allied Force sweep operations foiled many enemy planned highpoints. The required commitment of enemy combat troops in a food production role further restricted enemy activity throughout his planned Winter/Spring Offensive.

3 The most significant enemy action during the reporting period was the 28 March 1971 attack against FSB Mary Ann. The 406th Sapper Battalion conducted the attack supported by 82mm mortar fire. A combination of high explosive and CS agent mortar rounds were employed. The attack resulted in 33 US killed and 78 US wounded in action while the enemy sustained 12 killed in action.

(f) Quang Ngai Province.

1 In Quang Ngai Province enemy activity was restricted to attacks by fire and sapper attacks as Allied Force operations kept the enemy off balance. Allied Force operations coupled with the enemy's effort to replenish his diminished food supply kept enemy initiated activity at a low level during the first half of the reporting period. The more significant enemy actions during this period were rocket attacks directed against Quang Ngai City and Quang Ngai Airfield on 28 November 1970 and again on 2 and 5 December 1970 by elements of the 107th Heavy Weapons Battalion. Another significant attack was directed against FSB Honey on 30 November 1970, by elements of the 406th Sapper Battalion.

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2 During the last half of the reporting period, the enemy in Quang Ngai Province concentrated on rebuilding his forces and procuring rice to replenish his food supply. At this time the 21st Infantry Regiment received replacements from North Vietnam and subsequently moved to the lowlands with intentions of reestablishing its influence over the populace and disruption of the Government Pacification Program. As the 21st Infantry Regiment deployed to participate in a planned highpoint in early March 1971, its 70th Battalion was practically annihilated by Vietnamese Territorial, Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF). Following engagements with Territorial Forces on 3 and 4 March 1971, the 21st Infantry Regiment withdrew to base areas to the west along the Quang Ngai-Kontum Province border where they engaged in reorganization, retraining, and resupply activities in preparation for future highpoints.

2 Elsewhere in the province, enemy activity was characterized by economy of force measures such as occasional minings, acts of terrorism, and attempts to preserve his strength by avoiding Allied Forces sweep operations.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) Reorganization: The Collection Division, ACofS, G2, XXIV Corps has been reorganized into an Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch, a Sensor Management Branch, and a Ground Reconnaissance Branch.

1 The Technical Intelligence Branch previously reported in Collection Division was disbanded when the technical intelligence functions were assumed by the Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEC), MACV. CMEC has teams located at Da Nang and Phu Bai. The only technical intelligence functions currently being performed by Collections Division are screening of war trophies and issuing certificates for those trophies of no intelligence value. All other trophies are referred to CMEC.

2 Ground Surveillance Branch was redesignated to relate more specifically to the functions performed by the branch. The branch performs no function with radars but deals only with Phase I and III Unattended Ground Sensors.

(b) General: The Collection Division as organized above has continued to provide significant and timely intelligence to the ACofS, G2. Collection Division responded to 28 COMUSMACV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) during the reporting period. Additionally, as a result of Lam Son 719, requirements of MACV Special Collection Program - Laos (Nickname: Bent Axle) are being satisfied. Dissemination of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) pertaining to Bent Axle was formerly not releasable to foreign nationals (NOFORN). This restriction was removed by MACV on 7 February 1971 and the EEI were disseminated in the Vietnamese

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Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (13) (U)

language on 14 February 1971. Reporting on Bent Axle continuus.

(c) Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW).

1 A total of 522 detainees were interrogated in Military Region 1 (MR 1) during the reporting period. The breakdown by classification of these detainees is as follows:

<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>%</u>
NVA Hoi Chanh	27	5.2	NVA Prisoners of War	158	30.3
VC Hoi Chanh	<u>113</u>	<u>21.6</u>	VC Prisoners of War	<u>224</u>	<u>42.9</u>
TOTAL	140	26.8	TOTAL	382	73.2

2 The Collection Division, IPW Branch processed 953 batches of captured documents during the report period. The documents were evacuated to Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) for translation and exploitation.

(d) Sensor Management.

1 During November, OV-10A aircraft from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) were used to take advantage of periodic breaks in monsoon weather for air drop of Aerial Delivered Seismic Intrusion Device (ADSID) sensors. The new smoke marking cartridge and cartridge holder were tested on several missions and found to provide a significant improvement in accurately locating air implanted sensor strings.

2 In anticipation of issue of Phase III sensors to all units, both US and ARVN mobile training teams were used to present classes in each unit base area. These classes were especially effective in relation to ARVN instruction in that the classes were presented by ARVN to US personnel in English, thus adding prestige to the Vietnamization of the sensor program.

3 On 9 January 1971, the Phase III Battle Area Surveillance System (BASS III) became operational at Quang Tri Combat Base under control of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). The installation of BASS III with relays located at Observation Post (OP) Hickory, FSB Fuller, and FSB A-4 provided a greatly increased sensor readout capability and the ability to backup 50% of the Deployable Air Relay Terminal (DART) field, in case of DART failure.

4 During February 1971, this headquarters and Army OPCON units submitted MTOE requirements so that USARV could obtain authorization for sensor personnel and equipment.

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5 At the beginning of Lam Son 719, US Marine OV-10A aircraft implanted 25 sensor strings around Khe Sanh on suspected enemy avenues of approach. These strings were used primarily for target acquisition and early warning. On 1 March 1971, 16 additional strings were implanted by Marine OV-10A to support security of Route QL-9. US Air Force implanted sensor strings in Laos were primarily used for monitoring vehicular traffic along LOC into the Lam Son 719 area. Six of these strings were passed by DART to artillery for action. A total of 5,232 targets were detected, of which 694 were attacked. Artillery attacked 677 targets expending 3,339 rounds; mortars were used to attack 14 targets and radio firing devices were used against three targets. These attacks were particularly significant in that a majority of the targets were detected during darkness and inclement weather when other target acquisition agencies were less effective. Activity detected by other strings in the Lam Son 719 area was incorporated into the overall intelligence system supporting the operation.

6 During April 1971, US sensor program management was transferred from MACV J3-04 to USARV Sensor Target Acquisition Night Observation (STANO) Branch and maintenance management was converted to the Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS).

7 By 30 April 1971, the sensor program had been 85% converted to Phase III operations.

(e) Ground Reconnaissance.

1 During this reporting period, approximately 820 long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) were inserted in the Corps Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) on intelligence information collection missions. LRRP teams produced 413 sightings totaling over 2,146 enemy personnel observed and 270 contacts. Contacts, combined with air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings, resulted in 231 enemy killed and 33 prisoners captured. Contacts also provided information of enemy personnel movements, base camps, and troop concentrations.

2 ARVN long range reconnaissance teams in Military Region 1 contributed substantially to the above results. ARVN units deployed 264 LRRP teams resulting in 37 enemy troop sightings totaling over 315 enemy personnel sighted and 29 contacts. Contacts, combined with air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings, resulted in 100 enemy killed in action (KIA) and 25 prisoners captured. Due primarily to the redeployment of the 1st Marine Division the number of US LRRP teams available decreased from 45 teams to 32 teams during the reporting period. The number of ARVN teams available increased to 49 during the reporting period due to the addition of two teams within 1st Task Force.

(3) Weather.

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(a) The Northeast Monsoon Season and most of the spring transition to the Southwest Monsoon Season occurs during the period November 1970 through April 1971. Overall the weather during the reporting period was equal to or better than the average year, as depicted by climatology averages, however, from an operational point of view this proved to be misleading in that there were concentrated periods of adverse weather which affected operations.

(b) There was one primary forecasting problem affecting operational planning. This was the inability to forecast small, intense weather systems that moved over MR 1 from the South China Sea. These systems were only 30 to 50 miles in diameter. They had an average life expectancy of two to three days. These systems were difficult to identify due to lack of data on conditions over the sea and their small size. By the time their existence had been established from past data from the sea, they had usually moved over the coast producing rain and low cloud cover. Unfortunately, there is no known method for timely detection and forecasting of these systems. They will continue to create a significant operational problem by producing marginal or below marginal flight conditions for periods of 12 to 36 hours without warning.

(c) A serious visibility problem did arise during Operation Lam Son 719 which was directly related to weather conditions. However, it did not appear in the climatology tables used for planning the operation because it was a problem unique to a battlefield situation. This problem was the periodic development of dense dust, smoke, and haze layers created by vehicle activity, bombs, artillery shells, and atmospheric mixing by helicopter prop wash. When helicopters attempted assault landings, the prop wash created by the rotor blades stirred up enough additional dust to reduce visibility over the landing zone to near zero. When atmospheric conditions were favorable, this dust and smoke continued to mix in the atmosphere and spread over wide areas. This created large areas with visibility reduced to one to three miles below a flight level of 3,000 feet and visibility of only five to seven miles at flight levels up to 10,000 feet. The seriousness of this visibility problem was directly related to existing and forecast weather conditions. Consequently, the weather forecaster was able to give a forecast for this problem as part of the morning weather briefing.

(4) G2 Air.

(a) Organization: G2 Air Division organization remained essentially the same as the preceding period except that in November informal organizational adaptations were made to make offices correspond more closely to the functions performed. As a result, the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Branch was created to accommodate the mission planning and Direct Air Support Center functions as differentiated from the imagery interpretation (II) functions of the II Branch. The two branches of G2

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Air are manned jointly by personnel of HHC, XXIV Corps and the 204th
Military Intelligence Detachment.

(b) Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations.

1 In November 1970 the G2 Air expanded operational areas of interest to include the area from the border out to a line from WE4000 to YB0160 in Laos and above the DMZ to the WE00 line. All obsolete preplanned targets were deleted on 10 November 1970 from the in-country reconnaissance plan. The G2 Air established an avid program of collecting data on each province in MR 1, Laos, and the North Vietnam areas of interest. In December 1970 a new visual aerial reconnaissance program was established, delineating reconnaissance areas and re-defining unit responsibilities. Conservation of resources was highlighted at the November and December Monthly Reconnaissance Conferences. The number of O-1 sorties available in each of the two Reconnaissance Aircraft Companies (RAC) per month were as follows:

	<u>21st RAC</u>	<u>220th RAC</u>
November	275	815
December	567	570
January	686	762
February	712	788
March	764	1136
April	715	985

2 Commencing in December 1970, a vigorous program to use the KA 39 camera and hand-held cameras on O-1 visual reconnaissance missions was initiated. On 8 February 1971, the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance portion of OPORD Lam Son 719 was completed. Unit requests for photographic and infrared missions, both US Air Force aerial reconnaissance and US Army reconnaissance aircraft, increased considerably during the period of Operation Lam Son 719. Targets requested and completed were:

	<u>PHOTO</u>	<u>IR</u>
US Army	1577	2799
US Air Force	241	41

(c) Imagery Interpretation: During the reporting period, the

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Imagery Interpretation Branch received and reported on 1200 missions. These missions were read-out and the significant information posted on the section's Data Bases. Approximately 10 briefs were prepared and presented by the branch. These briefs were published as annexes to the XXIV Corps Periodic Intelligence Report weekly or bi-weekly as required. Those entries were mostly related to the status of infiltration routes into South Vietnam. The reproduction facility produced approximately 480 prints for Compass Link transmission. In addition, numerous rolls of 35mm film were developed by the facility for the Air Force visual reconnaissance (VR) program. During Operation Lam Son 719, the Reproduction Lab developed 30 rolls of film from visual reconnaissance missions over specific areas of importance.

c. Plans, Operations, Organization and Training.

(1) Boundary Changes.

(a) Effective 1 January 1971, Tactical Areas of Operational Responsibility (TAOR) were eliminated for US/Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). The obligation/responsibilities for TAOR's were transferred to the ARVN tactical commander. Therefore, the boundaries which delineated the US/FWMAF TAOR's are no longer in existence. Under this concept, US/FWMAF have Tactical Areas of Operational Interest (TAOI), the limits of which may or may not be defined by geographical features, or lines on a map. Within the TAOI's, US/FWMAF are assigned Areas of Operation (AO's) by the ARVN TAOR Commander, and boundaries are clearly defined.

(b) As a result of the withdrawal of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) from MR 1, the 23d Infantry Division was tasked to expand its TAOI to include Quang Nam Province. This phased expansion commenced on 13 April 1971, and will be completed on 7 May 1971. The expanded TAOI for the 23d Infantry Division will consist of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces, and overlap into areas immediately adjacent thereto.

(2) The following operations terminated during the reporting period:

(a) NOBLE CANYON. This operation commenced on 12 October 1970 and employed elements of the 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. The operation was conducted in the lowlands of eastern Quang Nam Province and was designed to complement the province saturation operation which was conducted concurrently. Noble Canyon terminated on 3 November 1970 with the following results:

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<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
0	9	4	1	0	0

(b) FREDERICK HILL. This operation was conducted in Quang Tin Province and used elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division in conjunction with Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces with the mission of search and clear/pacification. It commenced on 18 March 1969 and terminated on 1 March 1971. The following results were achieved:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
572	3910	7514	2572	1848	192

(c) PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE. This operation commenced on 29 March 1970 employing 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 23d Infantry Division in support of GVN forces. The mission was reconnaissance in force in the coastal plains of northeastern Quang Tin Province. The operation terminated on 1 March 1971 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
20	302	261	288	95	3

(d) GENEVA PARK. This operation was conducted in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces by elements of the 198th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division and GVN forces with the mission of search and clear/pacification. The operation commenced on 18 March 1969 and terminated on 1 March 1971 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
231	1796	2337	1458	5321	49

(e) IRON MOUNTAIN. This operation was conducted in Quang Ngai Province by the 11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division in coordination with GVN forces with the mission of search and clear/pacification. The operation commenced on 18 March 1969 and terminated on 1 March 1971 with

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the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
440	2858	4466	2724	1130	94

(f) NANTUCKET BEACH. This combined operation was conducted in eastern Quang Ngai Province by elements of the 198th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division and the 6th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division (ARVN). The mission was to clear the Batangan Peninsula of Main Force/Local Force units and Vietnamese Communist infrastructure. The operation commenced on 20 July 1969 and terminated 1 March 1971 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
51	651	630	634	207	5

(g) WOLFE MOUNTAIN. This 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) reconnaissance in force and saturation operation was conducted in northern and western Quang Tri Province and along the DMZ. The operation commenced on 22 July 1970 and terminated on 29 January 1971 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
34	336	299	31	61	20

(h) UPSUR STREAM. This search and clear/pacification operation was conducted by 1st Regiment, 1st Marine Division in coordination with GVN forces in central and northern Quang Nam Province. The operation commenced on 11 January 1971 and terminated on 29 March 1971 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
1	17	13	0	28	3

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(i) WASCO RAPIDS. This operation was conducted by the 198th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division and elements of the 6th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division (ARVN) and was designed to clear Local Force and Main Force elements from southwestern Quang Ngai Province. The operation was initiated on 13 March 1971 and terminated on 27 March 1971 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
0	13	11	0	1	0

(j) LAM SON 719. This was a combined operation in western Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces and southeastern Laos using elements of I Corps (Reinfs) (ARVN) and XXIV Corps (Reinf). The operation was initiated on 30 January 1971 with an artillery raid into the A Shau Valley by elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and an attack into western Quang Tri Province by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) to clear and secure Route QL-9 to the Laotian border. On 8 February 1971, I Corps (ARVN) attacked westward across the Laotian border along Route QL-9 to destroy enemy forces and stockpiles and sever enemy lines of communication. The operation terminated on 6 April 1971 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>
1749	6632	689	19,360	57	5170
					1963

(3) The following operations are in progress in MR 1.

(a) JEFFERSON GLEN. This operation is conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) in coordination with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), and GVN officials in Thua Thien Province with the mission of locating and clearing enemy forces, staging areas, and forward cache sites; protecting vital lines of communication; and pacification. The operation commenced on 5 September 1970 and has the following cumulative results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>
82	746	9	892	42	444
					76

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(b) IMPERIAL LAKE. This operation is a reconnaissance in force and pacification operation being conducted by elements of the 1st Marine Division in coordination with the 1st Task Force (ARVN) and GVN officials in southern and central Quang Nam Province. The operation commenced on 1 September 1970 and has the following cumulative results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
24	208	305	153	215	16

(c) MIDDLESEX PEAK. This is a reconnaissance in force and search and clear/pacification operation being conducted by the 196th and 198th Infantry Brigades, 23d Infantry Division in coordination with the 6th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division (ARVN) and GVN officials in central and northern Quang Tin Province. The operation was initiated on 1 March 1971 and has the following cumulative results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
45	339	274	118	83	7

(d) MONTANA MUSTANG. This operation is a 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) reconnaissance in force, and search and clear operation along the southern boundary of the DMZ and western Quang Tri Province. Combined operation with GVN forces in the coastal lowlands of Quang Tri Province are conducted to curb infiltration and secure the population. The operation was initiated on 9 April 1971 and has the following cumulative results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
2	43	25	0	7	1

(e) FINNEY HILL. This is a search and clear/pacification operation being conducted in Quang Ngai Province by elements of the 11th Infantry Brigade, 23 Infantry Division, 2d Infantry Division (ARVN) and GVN officials. The mission is to clear the area of local and main force Vietnamese Communist elements, eliminate the enemy infrastructure and disrupt their political apparatus in order to strengthen GVN control. The operation commenced on 1 March 1971 and has the following

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cumulative results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>
31	201		327	48	163
					28

(f) LAM SON 720. This is a joint operation by elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and 1st Infantry Division (Reinf) (ARVN) into the Da Krong and A Shau Valleys in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The mission is to locate and destroy enemy cache and base areas, interdict supply and infiltration routes and force the enemy to divert forces from other objective areas. The operation commenced on 18 April 1971 and has the following cumulative results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>
21	73	2	201	0	31
					10

(4) Redeployment of Forces. Increment VI Redeployment terminated on 30 April 1971. XXIV Corps units contributed 565 US Army and 11,681 US Marine Corps personnel spaces.

(5) Organization. The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) MTOE Update Program was initiated by Headquarters, USARV by letter dated 15 September 1970. During Phase I of this program, XXIV Corps was assigned proponency for MTOE document preparation for 70 units. Phase I submission was completed by 20 January 1971. Under Phase II of the TAADS Update Program, which continues past the end of this reporting period, XXIV Corps was assigned proponency for MTOE document update preparation for 76 units. Of these 76 units, 15 required no action to be taken. As of the end of the reporting period, 35 documents have been updated and forwarded to Headquarters, USARV. The remainder of the documents to be updated have not been received from USARV.

(6) Training.

(a) With more than half of the friendly combat casualties in MR 1 resulting from detonations of enemy mines, booby traps, and surprise firing devices during the last half of CY 70, command emphasis was placed on a program that would continually strive to establish measures to reduce these casualties. In assisting in this program, XXIV Corps conducted a mine, booby trap, and surprise firing device symposium at Camp Horn, Da Nang, RVN, on 30 December 1970. Representatives attended from

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XXIV Corps, III Marine Amphibious Force, XXIV Corps Artillery, 23d Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), 45th Engineer Group (Construction), MACV Combined Material Exploitation Center, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), US Army Engineer Command Vietnam, USARV Army Concept Team in Vietnam, I Corps (ARVN), 2d Republic of Korea Marine Corps Brigade, 1st Australian Task Force, US Army Advisor Group IC and MR 1, Combat Developments Command, and the 18th Engineer Brigade. Through unit and agency presentations and discussions, those attending were able to exchange ideas, operational techniques, and training methods concerning this problem. Salient conclusions resulting from this symposium included the maximum use of the Volunteer Informant Program (VIP), individual alertness and recognition of VC/NVA mine signs in the field, individual training on proven techniques, command emphasis down to squad level, and the constant need for exchange of information between friendly units. A report of this symposium was published and disseminated throughout the RVN.

(b) Training Assistance to RVNAF. XXIV Corps Regulation 350-6 was published on 2 March 1971 implementing training directives contained in Combined Campaign Plan (U) 1971 MR 1 (S). This regulation defines responsibilities, prescribes procedures to be used by US Military Forces in training RVN personnel, and establishes a list of recommended training subjects. Reporting formats were established to assist in monitoring training assistance. US Forces were encouraged to establish effective coordination with advisory personnel to determine those areas in which training assistance would be most productive.

(c) A review of XXIV Corps mandatory training requirements was completed on 23 April 1971. The review was conducted with the intent of eliminating those training requirements and administrative training requirements that are not mission essential. The review resulted in deletion of a XXIV Corps requirement for assigned and attached units to forward monthly training schedules to this headquarters. Recommendations regarding cumulative mandatory training requirements were forwarded to USARV.

d. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline.

(1) Civilian Personnel Management. The command currently employs the following local national (Vietnamese) direct hire personnel.

PAYMENT CATEGORY

AUTHORIZED

ASSIGNED

Appropriated Funds

Industrial Relations Office (IRO) 85

84

Nonappropriated Funds

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<u>PAYMENT CATEGORY</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Domestic Hire Employees	NA	120
Other Sundry Fund Employees	NA	26
Clubs/PX Employees	NA	93
Assistance in Kind	NA	82

(2) Maintenance of Unit Strength. Units assigned and attached to Headquarters, XXIV Corps maintained an authorized strength of 4229 with 4478 assigned at the end of the reporting period.

(3) 14 Day CONUS Leave Program. This program, instituted in December 1970 allows military personnel the privilege to spend 2 weeks leave in CONUS. Three charter airline services are available giving reduced rate fares for the round trip. World Airways and Trans International Airways in conjunction with United Service Organization (USO) and Pan American Airways in conjunction with United Service Club (USC) currently provide 8000 seats per month for this program. This command is responsible for implementing procedures to insure personnel, of all the United States military services in MR 1, have the opportunity to utilize the 14 Day CONUS Leave Program. Headquarters, XXIV Corps was first to institute an allocation system whereby units are allocated a given number of seats based on unit strength to insure equity of distribution to the troops in the field. Subsequently, this system was adopted by all major US commands. Currently, MR 1 maintains a modified allocation system for field units based on assigned unit strengths, while other regions within RVN have gone completely to a first-come, first-served basis for ticket sales. Military Region 1 retained this modified allocation system strictly for outlying units with the remainder of the tickets to be sold on first-come, first-served basis. MR 1's unique situation dictates the need for maintaining this modified system. This command looks forward to future total elimination of the allocation system, but must remain flexible due to tactical mission requirements, and to insure availability of tickets to the man in the field. The main intent is to make ticket availability as equitable for all as possible so that every qualified individual has an equal opportunity to partake in this program. To date this headquarters has experienced no major problems with this program, and feels it is, to a large degree, an extremely valuable factor in increasing troop morale.

(4) Adjutant General.

(a) Headquarters, XXIV Corps was assigned the zone coordinator responsibilities for special services operations by letter, AVHAG-B,

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Headquarters, USARV, 29 December 1970. Civilian employees (both nonappropriated fund and appropriated fund, US and local national) were attached to this headquarters. No military personnel spaces were allocated.

(b) To perform this function, the Adjutant General established a new division, Special Services (AGS), within his section. The mission assigned to this division was the coordination of all Special Services activities in MR 1 (MACV Dir 10-4). These activities include the normal core programs, (library, arts and crafts, service club, entertainment, sports) plus monitorship of the 16mm motion picture service.

(c) CG, XXIV Corps allocated two military spaces for the Special Services Division and directed the organization and relocation of the XXIV Corps Special Services Office to Camp Horn, Da Nang. A manning table was drafted; the new office was established and became operational on 2 February 1971 under the supervision of the Adjutant General, XXIV Corps. Military personnel were assigned on a temporary overstrength basis as needed to carry out the functions of the office.

(d) The Special Services Division also was designated the responsible agency for the takeover of control from Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force of the Freedom Hill Recreation Center effective 1 March 1971. The following actions were taken:

1. Military personnel were diverted from the replacement stream to take over the facility as the permanent staff.

2. The G1, XXIV Corps assumed responsibility for obtaining security guards for the facility.

3. The Freedom Hill Recreation Fund and Council were established and required budgets, minutes, etc., submitted. Funds for operation of the center were obtained from Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force and the Joint Services Nonappropriated Welfare Fund.

4. Work orders, requests for supplies and equipment, and purchase orders were submitted as needed.

5. Coordination was effected with representatives of the Director, Special Services Agency and Custodian, Joint Services Nonappropriated Welfare Fund, Headquarters, MACV and the Central Purchasing Agency, Saigon.

(5) Provost Marshal.

(a) As a result of widespread concern over the continuing high accident rate involving US military vehicles in Da Nang City and its environs, together with alarm over incidents wherein Vietnamese nationals adopted a

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practice of surrounding and detaining US military personnel and their vehicles in an effort to force quick settlement of their claims, a study was undertaken to determine the feasibility of establishing a truck bypass through the city. Coordination was established with commanders, GVN officials, and engineer personnel. A bypass route was selected and necessary improvements to the roadway were effected to upgrade the bypass to usable standards for the high traffic density it would serve. Combined military police patrols were established and aggressive patrolling of the area was instituted during the upgrading operation and after the bypass was opened for use. Although the road and bridges along the route could not accommodate the larger cargo vehicles, the bypass did provide an alternate, less congested route for light cargo vehicles, and alleviated traffic problems and accident prone situations in the city.

(b) With the standdown of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Army military police began assuming commitments and missions traditionally the responsibility of the 1st Marine Military Police Battalion. This mission expansion taxed the meager assets of the assigned Army military police battalion. Each military police function was scrutinized to determine if any of the functions would be appropriate for inclusion in the Vietnamization program and transferred to RVNAF military police. The responsibility for traffic control points at the approaches to the I Corps Bridge, a vital artery in the Da Nang City traffic circulation system, was selected as an important function that would be appropriate for assumption by RVNAF Forces. Coordination was effected with I Corps and the concept was adopted. On 15 November 1970, ARVN Quan Canh's assumed responsibility for the I Corps Bridge traffic control points.

(c) From 30 January to 9 April 1971, the Provost Marshal, this headquarters had operational control over supporting military police units throughout MR 1, during Operation Lam Son 719. The mission was to provide traffic control along Route QL-1 from Hue to Dong Ha and west on Route QL-9 to Khe Sanh. Significant requirements were to:

- 1 Escort and monitor convoys.
- 2 Operate mobile patrols throughout the area of operation for emergency assistance.
- 3 Provide road security in selected locations.

e. Logistics.

(1) General. During the reporting period the logistical posture throughout the Corps area of operations remained in a high state of readiness and was responsive to all demands.

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(2) Operations.

(a) Supply.

1 US Army Support Command (USASUPCOM) Da Nang assumed combat service support of residual elements of US Marine Corps and the 2d ROKMC Brigade effective 15 March 1971. Sufficient stocks were transferred from the Force Logistic Command to facilitate immediate support requirements. XXIV Corps monitored logistical support of these units effective the same date.

2 Forward Support Areas were established at Vandegrift and Khe Sanh to support units involved in Operation Lam Son 719 during the period February - March 1971. In addition, the Khe Sanh Airfield was improved and opened during this time frame. It remained operational for the duration of the operation.

3 Bulk POL products were placed under the USARV allocation system effective 15 November 1970.

(b) Maintenance.

1 Ground Maintenance.

a During this period the operational readiness of 105/155mm towed artillery in MR 1 remained above the USARV standard of 85%.

b The self propelled artillery weapons, M107/M109/M110, fell below the USARV readiness standard (85%) during support of Operation Lam Son 719. There were several combat losses and a few weapons lost through malfunctions.

c The M551, Sheridan, remained above the USARV readiness standard throughout most of the period.

d The M48A3 tanks remained below the USARV readiness standard throughout most of the period. A large number of combat losses occurred during Operation Lam Son 719.

e The armored personnel carrier, M113A1, remained above the USARV readiness standard (85%) throughout the period.

f During Operation Lam Son 719, it became apparent that armored units would have to plan on having maintenance standdowns at least at troop/company level, in order to maintain an adequate operational readiness rate during extended operations. Otherwise units will operate the equipment until it becomes inoperable, causing organizational maintenance problems to deteriorate into field maintenance problems. This situation seriously reduces the operational availability of the equipment and at the same

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time creates an unnecessary workload.

g During Operation Lam Son 719, retrograde operations became critical. Unit organic assets were marginal for performing both recovery and retrograde functions. Secondly, not all of the on hand equipment was operational, thus seriously reducing the already marginal capability. The presence of 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry increased the potential workload without increasing the retrograde assets. The seriousness of the problem did not become apparent until the extraction phase of the operation. At this time the available assets became overcommitted and additional assets had to be brought forward in order to handle the workload.

2 Aircraft Maintenance.

a The CH-54, cargo helicopter, remained above the USARV readiness standard (70%) throughout the period.

b The Marine helicopters, CH-53 and CH-46, were dropped for reporting purposes on 13 April 1971, because of III Marine Amphibious Force redeployment.

c The cargo helicopter, CH-47, remained below the USARV readiness standard (70%) from 15 February to 15 March 1971. This period was during Operation Lam Son 719.

d Both UH-1C and AH-1G gunships remained below the USARV readiness standard (70% and 75%) during most of the period that they were involved in the support of Operation Lam Son 719. These types of aircraft suffered a considerable number of combat losses and combat damages.

e The Operational Readiness of both, UH-1 and LOH-58, fluctuated around the USARV readiness standard (78% and 75%). Both of these types of aircraft experienced combat losses and combat damage during Lam Son 719.

f The OH-6 helicopters remained above the USARV readiness standard throughout the period.

(c) Real Estate.

1 Background. During the period 20 November 1970 - 20 April 1971, there were eight cantonments/facilities transferred to the RVNAF which were on real property records. The facilities listed in paragraph 2 were transferred to the RVNAF by United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces operating within MR 1.

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2 The Real Estate/Base Development Office of each military service carried out a myriad of functions such as preparing site plans and real property inventories of all occupied facilities, submitting communications - electronic listings, preparing legal agreements for non-United States transfers and submitting all required reports prescribed in MACV Directive 735-3 dated 26 November 1970, subject: Disposal of Real Property, Related Property, and other Property Associated with the Transfer of Bases in the Republic of Vietnam. Each transfer required an extensive chain of events and close coordination among subordinate commands and logistics command representatives of all US forces.

3 During the reporting period the following cantonments were transferred to the RVNAF.

<u>CANTONMENT NAME</u>	<u>DATE OF TRANSFER</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>
Camp Monahan	24 November 1970	228,940.00
Hill 10	2 December 1970	224,840.00
Sea Huts/Chu Lai	12 February 1971	12,200.00
Combat Base Ross	15 February 1971	164,809.00
Combat Base Baldy	3 March 1971	667,628.00
Ammunition Supply Point #1	15 March 1971	117,250.00
Camp Lauer/Stack Arms	23 March 1971	250,890.00
Hill 37N	13 April 1971	<u>109,700.00</u>
	TOTAL	1,776,257.00

f. Inspector General. None.

g. Information.

(1) Operations oriented toward the support of accredited media representatives covering combat actions in MR 1 and accomplishment of the Corps information mission in terms of Command and Public Information remained the primary function of the Corps Information Office augmented by the 24th Public Information Detachment (Field Service). In addition to accomplishing the basic mission, five significant activities came to the fore during the reporting period. These were:

(a) Establishment of a Corps Information Office (separate from the

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Da Nang Press Center).

- (b) Closure of the Da Nang Press Center.
- (c) Establishment of a press operations office at Da Nang Air Base.
- (d) Recommendation for inactivation of the 24th Public Information Detachment.
- (e) Participation in Operation Lam Son 719.

(2) On 9 January 1971, the XXIV Corps Information Section augmented by two information specialists from the 24th Public Information Detachment physically moved from the Da Nang Press Center, Da Nang City, to Camp Horn and established the XXIV Corps Information Office in the command building. The rationale of this move was to have an information function that would be more responsive to the needs of the Corps headquarters. Prior to the action, the Corps Information Section was overly involved in news media support which was more properly the main function of the 24th Public Information Detachment. The establishment of the Corps Information Office proved extremely profitable not only from the standpoint of responsiveness but from the standpoint of having an operational office pending the closure of the Da Nang Press Center.

(3) A steadily declining utilization of the Da Nang Press Center by accredited correspondents coupled to the cost of such an operation prompted a decision to close the center. A closure date of 1 April 1971 was selected and efforts were channeled toward accomplishing the closure on that date. The closure involved a variety of complex actions to include the dissolution of the press club, disposition of press club assets, turn-in and/or lateral transfer of 24th Public Information Detachment property, turning leased property back to owners, initial action to inactivate the 24th Public Information Detachment and to enlarge the Corps information section, and finally, establishing an alternate press operations office at Da Nang Air Base while continuing the normal media support. It is significant to note that the closure actions were concurrent with Operation Lam Son 719 which reduced the personnel and vehicle assets at the Da Nang Press Center. All closure actions were accomplished and the closure date of 1 April 1971 was met with no insurmountable problems.

(4) The establishment of a press operations office at Da Nang Air Base was necessary to provide communications, transportation assistance, and a base from which accredited correspondents could work. Actions involved in establishing this facility included negotiating with personnel at Da Nang Air Base for a site and for a usable building to be moved to the selected site. The US Air Force (366th Tactical Fighter Wing)

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responded quickly providing a site and building as well as accomplishing necessary electrical wiring and telephone servicing. An Army engineer unit tasked by the XXIV Corps Engineer moved the building and accomplished necessary repairs required as a result of the move. Operation at this new site commenced on 15 March 1971 which permitted a quasi standdown at the Press Center and greatly facilitated efforts to meet the press center closure date.

(5) The requirement to inactivate the 24th Public Information Detachment became obvious upon closure of the press center. The detachment's mission was to operate a press camp to include arrangements for billeting and messing as well as provide operational support in the form of transportation assistance, communications support, and briefings. It was determined that the mission of operational support to correspondents could be absorbed into the overall mission of the XXIV Corps Information Office provided a portion of the 24th Public Information Detachment's personnel and equipment were transferred to the Information Office. Necessary changes to authorization documents were submitted transferring two officer and six enlisted spaces from the 24th Public Information Detachment to the Corps Information Section.

(6) Elements of the XXIV Corps Information Office and the 24th Public Information Detachment participated in Operation Lam Son 719 from 28 January 1971 to 7 April 1971. The XXIV Corps Information Office (Forward) was established and became operational at Quang Tri Combat Base on 30 January 1971. The Quang Tri Press Camp became operational at the Quang Tri Airfield on 31 January 1971. Within the bounds of military security, the policy was to provide timely, factual, complete, and understandable information concerning US participation in and support of the operation and to afford accredited correspondents the opportunity to gather and transmit news as expeditiously as possible. An embargo was placed on Operation Lam Son 719 on 30 January 1971 for the safety of participating troops. This embargo was lifted at 0830 Greenwich Mean Time (1630 Saigon time) 4 February 1971. The press corps was notified as follows: "The embargo has served its purpose in that our casualties have been at an absolute minimum and we are now in a position to provide routine coverage of the operation." Release authority concerning the operation was maintained by MACV and all ground rules contained in MACV Directive 360-1 remained in effect.

(a) Evening press briefings concerning US unit actions and engagements were conducted at the Quang Tri Press Camp beginning Sunday, 31 January 1971, and terminating Sunday, 4 April 1971.

(b) At 1700 hours on 12 February 1971, an ARVN spokesman conducted a news conference and gave the press a briefing concerning ARVN Operation Lam Son 719. Effective that date, joint US/ARVN briefings were conducted

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at the Quang Tri Press Camp each evening at 1730 hours. Press memoranda were issued by the XXIV Corps Information Officer to cover specific situations and/or problem areas. Specific queries by members of the press were taken at the evening briefings and the XXIV Corps Information Officer would then obtain the desired information in as timely a manner as was possible.

(c) Command information functions were initiated at the very beginning of the operation in that commanders at all levels were directed to inform all participating troops of the purpose of the operation, the mission of their particular unit, and why their particular role was important to the success of the overall operation. The XXIV Corps Information Office (Forward) published Operation Lam Son 719 news highlights on a weekly basis and distributed them to participating troops.

(d) Free distribution for Stars and Stripes was made to all participating units. In coordination with USARV Information Office and the Stars and Stripes distribution system, an additional 1,000 copies of the paper were airlifted daily from Da Nang Air Base to Khe Sanh for further distribution with Class I supplies.

(e) XXIV Corps Information Office (Forward) compiled and produced a series of five-minute news summaries featuring the highlights of Operation Lam Son 719. These programs were aired over AFVN Radio Quang Tri and were designed to keep the troops in the field informed of the progress of the operation. At the conclusion of Operation Lam Son 719, commanders at all levels were urged to utilize every command information tool available to insure maximum dissemination of information about the results of the operation down to the individual soldiers.

(f) Logistical support was provided accredited correspondents in the form of billeting, messing, and transportation. Three Butler-type buildings at the Quang Tri Airfield were used to house the correspondents and military information personnel. Additionally, the buildings were used to facilitate scheduled briefings and other administrative and control procedures. Forty beds and twenty-five cots/stretchers were obtained from various supply resources. A field ration mess, located adjacent to the press camp, was open to correspondents. Cash collection sheets were utilized to account for the payment of correspondents' meals.

(g) The XXIV Corps Information Office (Forward) furnished two 3/4-ton trucks to be used as ground transportation for correspondents. In addition, I Corps Advisory Group Information Office provided one pickup truck for this purpose. On 4 February 1971, a UH-1H helicopter was supplied to transport correspondents to areas of interest within RVN. This helicopter flew more than 150 sorties within RVN in support of the press. On 26 February 1971, the US Command dedicated one UH-1H helicopter and two

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helicopter gunships to CG, I Corps, for the purpose of transporting correspondents into Laos. These helicopters flew 14 sorties to and from bases in Laos and more than 100 sorties in-country during the operation.

(h) All correspondents requesting billeting or transportation from Quang Tri Press Camp were required to show their MACV press cards. This precaution was taken to insure that all correspondents covering the operation were accredited by MACV and were therefore bound by the MACV ground rules. During 66 days of operation, the Quang Tri Press Camp gave assistance to 234 correspondents from 68 press agencies representing virtually every Free World nation.

(i) On 7 April 1971, the Quang Tri Press Camp was closed and all remaining Corps information personnel returned to Camp Horn to resume normal information duties.

h. Command History. None.

i. Aviation.

(a) Movement of units minus personnel and equipment. During the reporting period C Troop, 3/17 Cavalry was detached from 212th Aviation Battalion and returned to its parent unit minus personnel and equipment. Concurrently, D Troop 3/5 Cavalry was detached from 1st Aviation Brigade and rejoined its parent unit minus its personnel and equipment. The unit is currently assigned to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

(b) Aviation summary for Operation Lam Son 719 is as follows: There were a total of 118,614 in-country sorties flown, 45,828 out of country sorties flown for a total of 164,442 sorties. 103 aircraft were destroyed and 614 were damaged. Aviation casualties were 55 KIA, 178 WIA, and 11 MIA.

(c) Operational control of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Aviation Group (Combat) (Airmobile Division) was assigned CG, XXIV Corps on 16 April 1971.

j. Signal.

(1) Phase down and relocation of US Marine Corps units in Da Nang north and west has required elements of the 12th Signal Group to assume operations and maintenance responsibility of the 1st Marine Division AN/TCC 28 switchboard and to replace the AN/TCC 28 with an AN/MTC 9 switchboard in the Force Logistics Command's area in support of Army units located there.

(2) Automatic Secure Voice Communication (AUTOSSEVOCOM).

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(a) Secure Voice Cordless Switchboard (SECORD) 27 in Chu Lai was deactivated on 31 January 1971, concurrently with the activation of a Narrow Band Secure Terminal (NBST) for the 23d Infantry Division Tactical Operations Center. This terminal was homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang.

(b) A Wide Band Secure Terminal (WBST) was established in Phu Bai for use by 108th Artillery Group upon their redeployment from Dong Ha where a NBST was employed. As was the NBST, the WBST is homed off SECORD 35 in Phu Bai. The effective date was 6 November 1970.

(c) The following AUTOSEVOCOM terminals, with respective pertinent data, have been deactivated:

1 III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Operation Center, homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 14 April 1971.

2 1st Marine Division Alternate Command Post, homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 16 November 1970.

3 III Marine Amphibious Force, ACofS, G2, homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 24 November 1970.

4 Marine Aircraft Support Squadron Three, homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 24 November 1970.

5 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, homed off SECORD 79 in Da Nang (Monkey Mountain), effective 13 January 1971.

6 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, CG, homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 17 February 1971.

7 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Tactical Air Operations Center, homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 13 January 1971.

8 III Marine Amphibious Force, CG/Chief of Staff (CofS), homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 15 February 1971.

9 Marine Aircraft Control Group 18, homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 15 February 1971.

10 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, CofS, homed off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang, effective 17 February 1971.

(3) Da Nang East Dial Telephone Exchange. Effective 1 March 1971, the Federal Electric Corporation, a civilian contractor assumed responsibility for the Da Nang East Dial Telephone Exchange and the outside cable

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plant in the Da Nang East area. The 37th Signal Battalion formerly had operation and maintenance responsibility for the exchange.

(4) Systems Reconfigurations: During the reporting period no Defense Communication Agency Southeast Asia Mainland (DCA SAM) systems were activated or deactivated. There were nine permanent Corps Area Communication Systems (CACS) deactivated. They were as follows:

- (a) 12 channel system - Quang Tri to FSB Sally
- (b) 12 channel system - Chu Lai to Quang Ngai/Duc Pho
- (c) 12 channel system - Camp Evans to Phu Bai
- (d) 12 channel system - Chu Lai to Quang Ngai
- (e) 24 channel system - Chu Lai to Hawk Hill
- (f) 12 channel system - Chu Lai to Duc Pho
- (g) 12 channel system - Da Nang to Hoi An
- (h) 12 channel system - Chu Lai to Tam Ky
- (i) 24 channel system - Quang Tri Army to Dong Ha East

(5) Temporary systems: There were twenty temporary CACS activated and deactivated for Operation Lam Son 719. There have been eleven temporary CACS activated for Operation Lam Son 720 which is now in progress.

(6) Circuit Activations/Deactivations/Reterminations.

	<u>Activated</u>	<u>Deactivated</u>	<u>Rterminated</u>
(a) Permanent ICS Circuits	62	93	15
(b) Integrated Communication System (ICS) Circuits for Lam Son 719	40	40	0
(c) ICS Circuits for Lam Son 720	9	0	0
(d) CACS Circuits for Lam Son 719	153	153	0
(e) CACS Circuits for Lam Son 720	34	0	0

(7) Frequency Management. In accordance with MACV Speedletter dated 1 December 1970, which further restricted US FM frequencies, coordination

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was made with MACV J-6 allowing closer regulation of frequencies in MR 1. Plans were initiated to publish a new frequency allocation plan to reflect 1 December 1970 reductions in US FM frequencies and supersede the plan of 15 October 1970.

(8) Radioteletype. On 17 December 1970, XXIV Corps TAC #3 radioteletype net was placed on an experimental phase-down status. This action was taken to make more efficient use of operating personnel. The net can be placed into a fully operational status immediately if conditions warrant.

k. Engineer.

(1) Organization:

(a) During this period the 3d Mobile Construction Battalion (United States Navy) began its redeployment. The 62d Naval Mobile Construction Battalion redeployed on 10 November 1970.

(b) The remainder of the 84th Engineer Construction Battalion, assigned to the 45th Engineer Group (Construction), joined B Company in the Da Lang area and began operations during the month of January 1971. D Company arrived at Phu Bai in February and began operations in March.

(c) III Marine Amphibious Force redeployed during this period. At the end of the period 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade units consisted of A Company, 1st Marine Engineer Battalion, and A Company, 7th Marine Engineer Battalion.

(2) Combat Support Operations:

(a) Mine Warfare. There were 3,624 mine and booby trap incidents in MR 1 during the period; 1,300 of these were detected and caused no damage. There were 2,324 that were accidentally detonated, resulting in 254 Allied personnel killed and 1,985 wounded; 57 major pieces of equipment destroyed and 28 pieces damaged. These figures represent a 35.9 percent find ratio. US engineer units were sweeping a daily average of 160 kilometers (KM) of road for mines at the end of the period.

(b) Land Clearing.

1 In the Batangan area the 59th Engineer Company (Land Clearing) and a provisional platoon of the 26th Engineer Battalion continued land clearing operations during most of the reporting period. From 1 November 1970 to 31 March 1971, the 59th Engineer Company cleared 11,337 acres. The platoon of the 26th Engineer Battalion was released on 11 March after clearing 2,310 acres. Additionally, the 118th Engineer Company (Land Clearing) ARVN, which was activated during this period, cleared 361 acres from 28 December 1970 to 25 January 1971. Total acres cleared

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were 14,008.

2 On 11 March 1971, the provisional platoon 26th Engineer Battalion moved to the vicinity of FSB Stinson where they remained until 31 March 1971, clearing 674 acres. Next the unit moved to the Pineapple Forest area where they have cleared 211 acres of the 4,700 acres planned.

3 In January one platoon of the 59th Land Clearing Company moved to support Operation Lam Son 719. During the operation the platoon led the assault down Route QL-9 to the Laotian border, then worked along the same route clearing 50 to 100 meters on each side of the 40 KM road. On 15 March 1971 five members of the unit were killed in action and three more were wounded when enemy artillery fired on their positions near the Laotian border. Following this incident, the unit was placed on maintenance standdown after six weeks of continuous operations in support of Operation Lam Son 719.

4 Subsequent to Lam Son 719, to the end of the reporting period, the 59th Land Clearing Company has been working in two areas. One platoon is working with the 101st Airborne Division (Abml) in support of combat operations. The remainder of the unit moved to FSB Stinson area on 1 April 1971 and has since cleared 1,270 acres.

5 Total acres cleared by all units this period is 15,802.

(3) Significant Construction Projects:

(a) Military Region 1 Well Drilling Program. A qualified geological engineer completed the survey of the proposed sites within MR 1. Of the original 27 requests, 10 have been cancelled; three have been completed, work is progressing on two others. Of the eleven issued construction directives, three were assigned to projects recently cancelled necessitating an alteration to the construction directives. In addition to the approved program, site surveys have been requested for three new sites in Quang Ngai Province to support Allied operations there.

(b) Piedmont Airfields. Considerable progress has been made on a combined program to upgrade a series of piedmont airfields in Quang Ngai Province. Ba To Airfield, the last of the construction requirements, was completed during this period. Improvement to existing fields, to include helicopter refueling and rearm pads, have been affected in many areas thus increasing the flexibility of tactical air support. The most significant construction took place at Khe Sanh where, in support of Operation Lam Son 719, a 3,232 foot assault runway consisting of MX-19 aluminum matting and an additional 336,900 square feet of taxiway and parking aprons were emplaced. The existing and severely damaged AM2 aluminum mat runway at Khe Sanh was completely repaired, extended, and made operational.

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concurrently with the construction of the new runway. Upon completion of the operation 340,514 square feet of matting were removed and returned to depot storage. This consisted of all the MX-19 matting placed plus the AM2 matting taxiways. The old runway and M8A1 parking apron were used up to the last day and had to be left in place due to the tactical situation. Two sets of MX-19 aluminum matting will be maintained at the Da Nang Depot for contingency planning. Two sets are sufficient to construct a type II, C-130 airfield.

(c) Projects:

1 A considerable amount of engineer effort was expended on operational support missions that included construction of guard towers for defensive perimeters, revetments for hospital wards and helicopters, refueling and rearming pads, and helipads. On more sophisticated operational support projects the nondivisional engineer units are constructing 21,000 gallon bolted steel fuel tanks, railroad siding hardstands and dog kennels for scout dog platoons.

2 Other large projects requiring considerable expenditures of engineer resources are those needed to repair massive subgrade failures at four helicopter parking areas. The total scope of the four projects includes removal of 335,300 square feet of matting, stabilization of the subgrade and replacement of the matting.

(4) Road Construction:

(a) XXIV Corps Tactical Road Program. The concept of tactical road construction in XXIV Corps was revised and the new program published in XXIV Corps Reg 415-2, dated 24 January 1971. The new program identifies the stated needs of tactical commanders and prescribes standards of construction. Generally, this new program provides for all weather roads (rock base and surface treatment) to important US fire support bases. The total project scope includes 250 KM of tactical roads to be constructed by nondivisional units. Divisional engineers will continue to construct pioneer tactical roads. Work has begun on the roads in central and southern MR 1. Roads in the northern area were begun in March, after being delayed over two months by Operation Lam Son 719.

(b) Roads, General.

1 Lines of Communication. Two KM of highway QL-1 in MR 1 remain unpaved. This section through Quang Ngai City is currently being paved by Raymond, Morrison, and Knutson/Brown, Root, and Jones (RMK/BRJ) Contractors.

2 Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC). Provinces have programmed 160 KM of roads for construction in 1971. ARVN engineers

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will construct 55 KM of these CPDC funded roads.

2 ARVN. ARVN engineers plan to construct 116 KM of tactical and secondary roads in 1971. In addition to 55 KM funded by CPDC, 61 KM will be constructed using materials provided by US engineer units under "Dual Tasking" arrangement.

(5) Lam Son 719. A detailed account of engineer operations in Lam Son 719 is contained in the XXIV Corps After Action Report.

(a) Engineer support for the operation consisted of two battalions (-) from the 45th Engineer Group, the 14th Engineer Combat Battalion, the 27th Engineer Combat Battalion, and the combat companies organic to the three brigades involved in the operation. A reinforced company of the 326th Engineer Battalion (Ambl), designated Task Force 326, was formed to initiate the Khe Sanh Airfield construction.

(b) The intial engineer task was to open highway QL-9, from vicinity Vandegrift - west to Khe Sanh. There were 33 stream crossings to be bridged with tactical bridges, repaired, or bypassed. Simultaneously, elements of the 326th Engineer Battalion and the 27th Engineer Battalion were airlifted to Khe Sanh to begin work repairing the existing damaged AM2 aluminum mat airfield left by the Marines in 1968, and constructing a dirt assault strip next to it.

(c) The major engineer task of the operation was construction of the Khe Sanh (Ham Nghi) Base, with primary effort to airfield and helicopter facilities. The existing 3,600 foot aluminum mat runway was severely damaged by previous shellings, and repair began immediately. The job of removing or repairing shell holes was more difficult than anticipated, and this job was not completed until 1 March 1971. The runway was also extended to 3,900 feet. The parallel runway (dirt assault strip) was constructed in five days after the operation began. A C-130 landed on 5 February 1971, but the tire ruts indicated soil strength was not sufficient for continued operation. Due to the poor subgrade, it was decided to lay MX19 matting on this strip. Transportation of this matting was a tremendous burden on transportation assets at a time when transportation was critical. This 3,232 foot runway was completed and became operational on 15 February 1971.

(d) In addition to C-130 runways, the requirement for dust-free facilities for landing, parking, refueling, and rearming helicopters was overwhelming. Over 700 helicopters were involved in the operation and the number of sorties in and out of Khe Sanh each day was extremely large. Eventually, 66,500 square meters of refuel/rearm area and 300,000 square meters of parking area were built, but the engineer units could not construct at the rate desired or required. The tactical requirements to use the runways in lieu of helicopter pads hindered construction and repair of these strips.

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(e) Lack of timber materials at supply points made construction of field fortifications for tactical units impossible until near the end of the operation.

(f) The reconstruction of highway QL-9 continued throughout the operation. At 12 crossing sites, six M4T6 dry gap span bridges, five armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLB) and one Bailey Bridge were installed. One existing Bailey, and three permanent bridges were repaired. Culverts were placed at all possible crossing sites to supplement bridging. Highway QL-9 to Laos was opened to wheeled and tracked vehicles in six days. Improvement to the road (widening, shaping and ditching), to allow normal use by military vehicles continued throughout the operation. Tactical roads were constructed to aid cross country movement of armored, cavalry, and artillery units. A 26 KM route called "Red Devil Road", running from QL-9 north of Vandegrift to Khe Sanh, was constructed by A Company, 7th Engineer Battalion of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), parallel to route QL-9 and north of it by about 9 KM. This route was a pioneer tank trail, but proved successful in allowing the armored units to screen north of route QL-9. This road was upgraded to permit wheeled traffic during the withdrawal phase.

(g) On 25 March 1971, the withdrawal phase from Khe Sanh began with the removal of the MX-19 aluminum mat runway. By 31 March, the 27th Engineer Battalion had removed, bundled and shipped out by C-130, more than 800 tons of aluminum matting. On 3 April, the 14th Engineer Battalion and A Company, 7th Engineer Battalion began removal of the 12 tactical bridges installed on Route QL-9. The last bridge, a Bailey Bridge, was removed on 8 April 1971 as the last armored units withdrew from the area.

(h) With the conclusion of Lam Son 719, the engineer units returned to normal operational support missions and the tactical road program.

1. Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations.

(1) Civic Action

(a) Military Civic Action. The summary of military civic action accomplishments by US military forces in MR 1 for the reporting period is as follows: A total of 22,296 man days, based on a 10 hour day, were expended in support of military Civic Action. Total monetary expenditures were VN\$ 8,322,171 (VN\$ 5,892,610 from military resources, VN\$ 983,270 from the Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Assistance in Kind Fund, and VN\$ 1,446,291 from voluntary contributions). All projects completed used an average of 73 percent self help labor and 20 percent of the materials furnished were from Vietnamese resources. A breakdown of the civic action effort follows:

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<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>MANDAYS</u>	<u>VN\$</u>
Economic Development	1,887	676,404
Education	1,898	817,880
Social Welfare	5,816	3,808,514
Transportation	6,919	609,028
Refugee Support	1,108	362,119
Others	4,668	2,048,171

Institutions assisted during the reporting period included 181 schools, 182 orphanages, 193 hospitals/dispensaries, and 50 others.

(b) Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP): A total of 26,699 persons were treated by MEDCAP personnel; none of these resulted from hostile action. Additionally, 558 persons received dental treatment. A total of 100 immunizations were administered: 21 plague, 21 cholera, and 58 miscellaneous injections. US medical personnel trained 389 Vietnamese health workers in first aid and nursing techniques in conjunction with MEDCAP. Medical personnel taught 102 personal hygiene/sanitation classes to 882 persons.

(c) The XXIV Corps Disaster Relief Coordination Center was activated on 19 November to coordinate flood relief operations. ACoFS, G5, assisted by the Da Nang Support Command and the 29th Civil Affairs Company, coordinated and supervised the pickup and distribution of 85 truckloads of salvage lumber and construction materials to assist in rebuilding flood victim's homes. During severe flooding of MR 1, G5 coordinated and assisted GVN/ARVN in rendering assistance to approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ million Vietnamese flood victims.

(d) The MR 1 Flood Relief Committee, with LTG Lam, CG, I Corps and MR 1 (ARVN) as the chairman, met daily during November and December to consider substantive problems resulting from the flood damage. Committee members briefed LTG Lam on the rice supply and bridge repairs, progress in responding to the basic needs of the flood victims, and repairs to public facilities. LTG Lam issued positive guidance, and, when appropriate, requested assistance of the US community. US representatives on the committee were: Deputy Senior Advisor, MR 1; the assistant Deputy for Civil Operations for Rural Development Support (CORDS) (Military); the XXIV Corps ACoFS, G5; and the III Marine Amphibious Force, ACoFS, G5.

(e) G5 representatives delivered Vietnamese toys (VN\$197,000) to

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the I Corps (ARVN) Soldier's Family Aid Association (IC SFAA) on 19 January 1971. On 21 January 1971, G5 representatives accompanied Mrs. Lam (President, IC SFAA) and assisted her in distributing these toys to the children of the Sacrificed Soldier at Nguyen Tri Phuong Street School, Da Nang. After the toy presentation, G5 representatives were invited by the Vietnamese I Corps (ARVN) Commander's wife to accompany her as she presented monetary TET gifts to Duy Tan Hospital and the ARVN Convalescent Center, Da Nang.

(f) The Civil Affairs Officer sponsored two regulations. The first, XXIV Corps Reg 27-3 subject: "Accident Reaction Teams", provided supplemental guidance for more expeditious settlement of accident disputes. The second, XXIV Corps Reg 525-25 subject: "Acquisition of Earth Fill", prescribes the proper procedure for obtaining earth fill to preclude violation of personal property rights, grave sites and damaging GVN training areas.

(2) Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

(a) General: XXIV Corps characterized psychological operations in MR 1 by the conduct of centrally planned intensified PSYOP campaigns in the locality of potential Chieu Hoi rallies with decentralized execution by units in their respective TAOI. XXIV Corps and subordinate units conducted and supported several PSYOP campaigns during this reporting period. Lam Son 719 Quang Tri Province was the major PSYOP campaign.

(b) Campaigns.

1. XXIV Corps established a G5 Section at XXIV Corps (Forward) in Quang Tri Province on 6 February 1971, and in conjunction with the G5 Section at XXIV Corps Main, conducted civil-military operations (CMO) to undermine the morale of the enemy, weaken the bond between VC/NVA and the civilian populace, and to assist and support ARVN CMO actions for Lam Son 719. US/RVNAF forces integrated PSYOP and civil affairs into all tactical operations. They supported tactical operations by leaflet dissemination; air, ground, and waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts; and face-to-face communications. CORDS coordinated activities of the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) who conducted PSYOP through the media of radio, TV, newspapers, posters, handbills, and use of teams for conducting face-to-face propaganda during rallies. S5, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) attached two US audio-visual (HE) teams from Det 2, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion to Quang Tri Province Psychological Advisor to provide news of the RVNAF accomplishments during Lam Son 719 to the local populace. The 110th Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) Squadron flew aerial PSYOP throughout MR 1, but was especially effective disseminating leaflets over targets in Laos. Flight "A", 9th Special Operations Squadron (9th SOS) provided aerial PSYOP support throughout

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MR 1, and C-130 aircraft from the 7th US Air Force conducted massive leaflet drops, both strategic and tactical in support of this joint US/ARVN operation. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), although under operational control of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), remained the primary point of contact with the Quang Tri Province Chieu Hoi Center throughout Operation Lam Son 719. The 10th Political Warfare (POLWAR) Battalion and the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion produced printed media as directed by the MR 1 Combined Psychological Operations Center (CPOC), and provided loudspeaker (HB) and (HE) teams to the US and ARVN tactical units. The 7th Psychological Operations Battalion provided required off-shore printing support for massive aerial leaflet drops. G5 personnel conducted daily meetings with I Corps (ARVN) POLWAR personnel and US PSYOP and GA personnel to support and assist CMO. US and ARVN PSYOP personnel employed aerial and surface PSYOP assets to exploit significant vulnerabilities of NVA units following US or ARVN troop contact, artillery, tactical air, or B-52 strikes. PSYOP themes employed covered the gamut from demoralization, desertion, and Chieu Hoi; to special messages prepared for Lam Son 719 by President Thieu and the I Corps (ARVN) Commander. Units used appropriate leaflets in the MR 1 CPOC catalog, and requested leaflets to exploit ralliers using photos of the Hoi Chanh and appeals written in the ralliers handwriting. CPOC developed 17 additional leaflets and six additional tapes. The 110th VNAF Squadron and elements of 7th US Air Force dropped President Thieu's May 1970 and February 1971 messages over strategic targets in Laos. XXIV Corps coordinated with MACV J3-11 on a regular basis to obtain massive leaflet drops to exploit the psychological advantage created by the Arc Light (B-52) strikes, tactical air strikes, artillery strikes, and ground tactical actions. Based on previous lessons learned, arrangements were made to have massive leaflet drops coordinated with Arc Light missions, with the leaflets being disseminated shortly after B-52 raids. 7th US Air Force C-130 aircraft dropped a total of 121.4 million leaflets. Flight "A" of the 9th SOS, the 110th VNAF Squadron, and tactical organic aircraft dropped a total of 35.7 million leaflets in support of this operation, and conducted in excess of 119 aerial and broadcast hours. Broadcast themes closely paralleled the leaflet themes mentioned above. The tactical requirement for helicopters reduced their availability for PSYOP missions. Units overcame this problem in a number of ways. PSYOP personnel rode with courier aircraft travelling throughout Quang Tri Province dropping leaflets on targets along the route. The 11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division fired 105mm propaganda rounds, targeting enemy positions along the DMZ. In addition, they coordinated with battalion S3s to have DMZ patrols hand disseminate leaflets. Throughout the AO, XXIV Corps used HE and HB teams extensively to hand disseminate leaflets.

2 XXIV Corps, in conjunction with I Corps (ARVN), conducted two psychological operations in MR 1 employing searchlights at selected US and

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and ARVN fire bases. The searchlights were illuminated during the night to act as beacons for guiding ralliers to safe areas to Chieu Hoi. The Corps conducted campaigns during the New Years truce period of 28 December 1970 - 3 January 1971 and during the TET holiday period 26-29 January 1971. The PSYOP theme used was "Rally to the Light of Freedom and Start a New Life with the GVN." The campaign stressed family appeals to relatives and loved ones in enemy ranks encouraging them to rally and reunite with their family during the Vietnamese New Year. MR 1 CPOC in coordination with XXIV Corps developed and produced special leaflets and tapes in support of the operations. Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) made PSYOP appeals through the Da Nang and Hue radio and TV stations, and provincial radio stations. US and ARVN PSYOP resources conducted an intensified campaign to include employment of ground loudspeaker teams, aerial broadcasts and leaflet dissemination. The main appeal instructed the enemy to move to the vicinity of the lights during the night and wait until daylight to rally. A total of 107 enemy rallied during the course of the two operations. It should be noted that US/ARVN units did not conduct any military operations at the time of these campaigns because of the truce, therefore no military pressure was brought to bear to influence potential ralliers. A Department of Defense contractor is conducting an analysis of the PSYOP effectiveness of the TET campaign.

(3) Subordinate units.

(a) During this reporting period, the 23d Infantry Division concentrated its PSYOP effort on increased coordination between US and ARVN units in an on-the-job training program for ARVN counterparts. An officer from G5, 2d Infantry Division (ARVN) participated in 23d Infantry Division organic aircraft aerial PSYOP missions and received training in all aspects of US PSYOP techniques. The ARVN have now employed this training in conducting independent operations using their own resources. US/ARVN employed 9th Special Operations Squadron and organic aircraft for quick reaction exploitation of ARVN and RF/PF successes to demoralize the enemy and induce him to rally. The division conducted an extensive campaign on the Batangan Peninsula of Quang Ngai Province in conjunction with tactical and land clearing operations. XXIV Corps supported the operations with saturation techniques coordinating the US, ARVN, and GVN PSYOP assets into one area with the specific mission of neutralizing the enemy forces through Chieu Hoi and PSYOP appeals. Seventy-four Hoi Chanhhs rallied during conduct of this operation. The 23d Infantry Division G5 conducted a study of the VIP theme and the turn-in of munitions. The 11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division, conducted an intensive VIP campaign in the northern coastal districts of Quang Tri Province during their support of Lam Son 719. The brigade employed a technique which was extremely effective. They left money and C-rations with military police at roadside checkpoints which allowed villagers to turn-in munitions for reward at any time of

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the day. The result of this campaign conducted between 15 March and 1 April 1971 was 375 munitions turned in ranging from unexploded 155mm rounds to grenades. Numerous small arms rounds and other types of munitions were collected, 35% of which were of Soviet/ChiCom origin.

(b) To compensate for loss of aerial PSYOP support caused by inclement weather, the 1st Marine Division focused major emphasis on ground psychological operations using armed propaganda teams (APT), cultural drama teams, and POLWAR teams to reach the people with the message of GVN. APT's working with the Division conducted PSYOP during cordon and search operations. Working in platoon sized elements, these teams also went into villages and interviewed families to compile lists of suspected VC. They used the information they gathered to write Chieu Hoi appeals to induce suspects to rally. The teams conducted attitude surveys which revealed the reaction of the local populace to VC activity in the area. The platoons gathered information on the extent of VC taxation and food collection and the information was used as guidance in the development of PSYOP appeals. ARVN POLWAR teams, working with Marine battalions, performed MEDCAP/DENTCAF on a regular basis while conducting PSYOP broadcasts and disseminating leaflets. They provided medical treatment for more than 16,000 Vietnamese.

(c) The 101st Airborne Division (Abn) disseminated several million leaflets in a coordinated PSYOP effort with the Thua Thien Province PSYOP Advisor. They flew aerial missions using Chieu Hoi, Volunteer Informant Program and Phuong Hoang themes, mainly targeting the lowland populace. Working closely with prisoner of war interrogators and order of battle specialists, they developed leaflets exploiting psychological vulnerabilities of specific enemy units by name and location. In January 1971, the G5 initiated the Cypress Garden campaign targeting the C-3 Co, Phu Loc Special Action unit located in the Vinh Phong Mountain Region. The campaign stressed fear of death themes employing tactical operations in conjunction with ground, waterborne, and aerial broadcasts plus leaflets disseminated by organic aircraft and artillery propaganda rounds. G5 PSYOP conducted a dual purpose campaign during February 1971 at the request of Thua Thien Province officials. Loudspeaker teams targeting the local populace along Highway QL-1 and Route 551 warned the people of the dangers of using the volatile aviation fuel leaking from the pipeline running parallel to the highways. The teams also broadcast highway safety messages and warnings of increased hazardous conditions due to heavy convoy traffic in support of Lam Son 719.

(d) The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), working in conjunction with the Quang Tri Province PSYOP Advisor, concentrated its PSYOP efforts on targeting the local populace informing them of the successes of ARVN and RF/PF units in Quang Tri Province and enhancing the image of GVN. They employed both the US Air Force, 9th Special Operations Squadron,

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and the brigade's organic aircraft to target enemy units with demoralization and anti VC/NVA themes. The 1st Brigade also made extensive use of their HE and HB teams' ground broadcast capability. The brigade shifted emphasis in January 1971 to support of ARVN operations in Lam Son 719. During the operation the brigade exploited four Hoi Chachs by producing quick reaction tapes and developing leaflets with a picture and hand written personal appeal message exhorting their comrades to rally. They developed a leaflet exploiting 81 Bru Montagnard tribesman who were previously used by the enemy as force laborers. The front side of the leaflet featured a group picture of the Brus and the reverse side had a picture story showing how the VC/NVA took the men out of their hamlets and forced them to work as supply bearers in transportation units. The leaflet had a minimum of writing because of the high illiteracy rate among the target audience. During the Lam Son 719 operation, the 1st Brigade cross-trained all personnel in their S5 Section and Det 2, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion to operate the UH-6 aerial loudspeaker system. Through close coordination with XXIV Corps G5 (Forward), they provided helicopter broadcast support to all brigades operating in Quang Tri Province. In situations where an enemy vulnerability was revealed and a tape for aerial broadcast was unavailable, the PSYOP personnel used their ARVN interpreters to broadcast appropriate messages from current leaflet and tape catalogs. The Volunteer Informant Program concentrated on the lowland districts. An intensified PSYOP program to reduce mining of watercraft on the Cua Viet River is a continuing campaign. District Chiefs and advisors provided excellent cooperation in this program.

(e) The 2d Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) Brigade conducts civil military operations independently of US control; however, an excellent rapport exists, and they draw upon US advice, and request US resources through the MR 1 CPOC. During the reporting period, the 2d ROKMC Brigade G5 conducted 5 major PSYOP campaigns. Twenty enemy rallied to the ROK Marines during this period of time. The ROK Marines disseminated in excess of 17 million leaflets and conducted 300 speaker hours.

(4) PSYOP Support.

(a) 7th US Air Force.

1 90th Special Operations Squadron (SOS). In January 1971, the G5, XXIV Corps completed coordination with MACV J3-11 for weekly Frantic Goat massive leaflet missions in support of operations in MR 1. This represents a 400% increase in 7th US Air Force C-130 PSYOP support in MR 1. Frantic Goat missions, originating in either Okinawa or Cam Ranh Bay, employ aircraft from 90th SOS which have the capability of covering a target area of 1,000 square miles with 12 million leaflets. The leaflet capacity and operating altitude of the C-130 insured target saturation over a large

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area without subjecting the aircraft and crew to the hazard of hostile antiaircraft fire. In addition to regular operations, XXIV Corps requested these massive air drops to support Lam Son 719, both in Vietnam and in Laos, as a means of providing information of the Laotian incursion to the populace of MR 1 and to obtain a tactical and strategic psychological advantage over enemy forces. Numerous Hoi Chanh who rallied during Lam Son 719 carried leaflets dropped by 7th US Air Force C-130s. As previous PSYOP studies indicated, the enemy deeply feared artillery, tactical air, and Arc Light B-52 strikes. XXIV Corps and I Corps (ARVN) exploited this enemy vulnerability through coordination of massive leaflet drops following, B-52 strikes.

2 9th Special Operations Squadron. Flight "A", 9th SOS, US Air Force supported the aerial PSYOP effort in MR 1 by flying 693 missions over 18,562 target areas, disseminating 263,438,000 leaflets and broadcasting 677 hours. US/GVN tactical and governmental agencies requested these missions through the MR 1 CPOC.

(b) The 7th Psychological Operations Battalion continues a phased turn over of equipment to 10th Political Warfare Battalion (ARVN) which will eventually assume PSYOP production responsibilities for MR 1. 10th Political Warfare Battalion (ARVN) personnel now perform plate production and press runs. Graphics operation includes preparation of content for poster and leaflet layouts. The Vietnamese Information Service assigned a representative to work in the Combined Propaganda Development Section (CPDS) of the MR 1 CPOC in order to establish better coordination between the military and civilian branches of development. The 7th Psychological Operations Battalion is in process of reassigning its audio visual teams (HE) from direct support of US tactical units to supporting Province PSYOP Advisors (PPA). This will increase the PSYOP assets available to provinces considerably. The ground broadcast teams (HB) will remain with US combat units as long as required. In February 1971, the battalion formed a Mobile Field Interrogation Team (MINT) designed to assist the PPA's, on a request basis, in exploitation of PSYOP intelligence.

(5) Luc Luong 66. The XXIV Corps hosted a meeting of Luc Luong 66 coordinators in MR 1 on 31 March 1971. Representatives from USARV CMO and MACV Chieu Hoi Directorate were also present. The purpose of the meeting was to establish new procedures for routing scout draft deferment requests and termination. Members of the meeting established the policy to send paperwork directly to MACV Mobilization Directorate and provide information copies to intermediate headquarters. This action will eliminate loss of deferments and termination as well as reduce unnecessary staffing delays. Other topics of discussion at the meeting were procedures in case of death, compensation payments, monthly reporting and recruiting of scouts.

(6) The PSYOP Officer prepared three regulations. The first was

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XXIV Corps Regulation 525-22, subject: PSYOP for Herbicide Operations. The second was XXIV Corps Regulation 525-23, subject: Safeguarding of Private Property and Control and Disposition of Captured Enemy Supplies, and the third was XXIV Corps Regulation 10-6 subject: Organization and Function of PSYOP. The PSYOP section also prepared XXIV Corps Staff Memorandum 525-2, same subject, a disaster relief annex to OPLAN 17-C71, Typhoon/Tropical Storm and Natural Disaster Contingency Plan, a PSYOP annex to the Corps Brightlight Plan, Rice Denial Plan, and the Spring - Fall Campaign Plan. PSYOP section prepared two OPORDS during this period, one Mine and Booby Trap Campaign, and the Civil-Military Operations annex to XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 OPORD.

(7) The following is a summary of the PSYOP production and dissemination for MR 1 during the reporting period:

New leaflets requested	406
New leaflets produced	374*
Magnetic broadcast tapes requested	57
Magnetic broadcast tapes produced	57
Reprints of printed material requested	320
Reprints of printed material produced	307*
Total amount of new printed (leaflet equivalents)	56,439,125
Total amount of reprints (leaflet equivalents)	42,329,339
Leaflet targets scheduled	22,870
Leaflet targets flown	12,110**
Aerial broadcast targets scheduled	20,414
Aerial broadcast targets flown	6,452**

* The difference between the printed media requested and that actually printed resulted from the use of items already in stock or the substitution of a very similar item already on hand.

** The difference between the target scheduled and the targets flown resulted from targets not flown due to adverse weather conditions.

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m. Corps Artillery

(1) Organization.

(a) During the month of January 1971, the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery began its move to Quang Tri Province, to take part in Operation Lam Son 719. The battalion remained in Quang Tri Province with the mission of general support reinforcing 1st Infantry Division Artillery (ARVN).

(b) In February, D Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery moved into Quang Nam Province to provide heavy artillery support to the 11th Marines.

(c) During the month of March 1971, the entire 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, US Marine Corps stooddown. This battalion was followed by A Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery with 6x105mm and 2x155mm Howitzers (How), which stooddown during the month of April 1971.

(d) Major Personnel Changes.

1 6 March 1971 - COL Joseph T. Breunig assumed duties as Deputy Commanding Officer (DCO), XXIV Corps Artillery replacing COL Bruce Holbrook.

2 6 March 1971 - LTC Richard B. Maucere Jr assumed duties as Executive Officer (XO), XXIV Corps Artillery replacing COL Joseph T. Breunig.

(2) Significant Activities.

(a) Support for Operation Jefferson Glen. XXIV Corps Artillery supported operations of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) from Fire Support Bases Gia Le, Birmingham, Rakkasan, Anzio, and Sally.

(b) Support for Operations Wolfe Mountain and Montana Mustang. XXIV Corps Artillery supported operations of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) from Fire Support Bases A-4, C-1, C-2, Vandegrift, Nancy, Barbara, Camp Carroll, Mai Loc and Combat Base Dong Ha.

(c) Support for operations in Quang Da Special Zone and 1st Task Force. XXIV Corps Artillery units supported the 1st Marine Division from FSB Rawhide, Nac, and Combat Base Ross.

(d) Support for Operation Lam Son 719. XXIV Corps Artillery units supported the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and I Corps (ARVN) from fire bases in western Quang Tri Province.

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(e) Artillery Raids/Moves for Reinforcing Fires. XXIV Corps Artillery units conducted 138 raids/moves during the reporting period. The majority were to provide reinforcing fires on Operation Lam Son 719. This reflects a significant increase of this type of mission from the last reporting period.

(f) Artillery Moves.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TUBES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DATE</u>
B/8-4	4X175	C-2	Vandegrift	11 Nov 70
B/8-4	4X175	Vandegrift	C-2	12 Nov 70
C/2-94	2X175	Hill 65	Hill 52	17 Nov 70
C/2-94	2X175	Hill 52	Hill 65	17 Nov 70
B/1-83	2X8"	Birmingham	Bastogne	1 Dec 70
B/1-83	2X8"	Bastogne	Birmingham	1 Dec 70
B/8-4	4X175	C-2	Vandegrift	7 Dec 70
B/8-4	4X175	Vandegrift	C-2	8 Dec 70
B/1-83	2X8"	Birmingham	Anzio	17 Dec 70
B/1-83	2X8"	Anzio	Birmingham	19 Dec 70
C/1-39	4X8"	Barbara	Carroll	4 Jan 71
A/1-39	Comp	Carroll	Barbara	4 Jan 71
C/2-94	2X175	Hill 65	Hill 52	13 Jan 71
B/8-4	4X175	C-2	Vandegrift	15 Jan 71
B/8-4	4X175	Vandegrift	C-2	16 Jan 71
C/2-94	2X175	Hill 52	Hill 65	17 Jan 71
B/2-94	4X175	Nac	Dong Ha	22 Jan 71
HQ Btry 2-94 NA		Da Nang	Nancy	24 Jan 71
SVC Btry 2-94 NA		Da Nang	Nancy	24 Jan 71

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TUBES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DATE</u>
C/2-94	4X175	Hill 65	Nancy	24 Jan 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Ross	Sally	24 Jan 71
HQ Btry 2-94	NA	Nancy	Dong Ha	26 Jan 71
SVC Btry 2-94	NA	Nancy	Dong Ha	28 Jan 71
HHB, 108th Gp(FWD)	NA	Phu Bai	Dong Ha	28 Jan 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Sally	Dong Ha	28 Jan 71
C/2-94	4X175	Nancy	Dong Ha	28 Jan 71
HQ Btry 2-94	NA	Dong Ha	Vandegrift	29 Jan 71
SVC Btry 2-94	NA	Dong Ha	Vandegrift	29 Jan 71
HHB XXIV Corps				
Arty (Fwd)	NA	Da Nang	Quang Tri	29 Jan 71
B/2-94	4X175	Dong Ha	Vandegrift	29 Jan 71
C/2-94	4X175	Dong Ha	Vandegrift	29 Jan 71
C/1-83	Comp	Gia Le	Sally	29 Jan 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Dong Ha	Vandegrift	30 Jan 71
HHB 1-39 (Fwd)	NA	Nancy	Dong Ha	31 Jan 71
HQ Btry 8-4	NA	Dong Ha	Vandegrift	31 Jan 71
SVC Btry 8-4	NA	Dong Ha	Vandegrift	31 Jan 71
A/8-4	4X175	Carroll	Vandegrift	31 Jan 71
B/8-4	4X175	C-2	Vandegrift	31 Jan 71

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TUBES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DATE</u>
C/8-4	4X8"	A-4	C-2	31 Jan 71
C/1-83	Comp	Sally	Dong Ha	31 Jan 71
HQ Btry 8-4	NA	Vandegrift	Lang Chanh	1 Feb 71
SVC Btry 8-4	NA	Vandegrift	Lang Chanh	1 Feb 71
A/8-4	4X175	Vandegrift	Lang Chanh	1 Feb 71
B/8-4	4X175	Vandegrift	Lang Chanh	1 Feb 71
C/8-4	4X8"	C-2	Lang Chanh	1 Feb 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Vandegrift	Bong Kha	1 Feb 71
C/1-83	Comp	Dong Ha	C-2	1 Feb 71
HHB 108th Gp (Fwd)	NA	Dong Ha	Lang Chanh	2 Feb 71
A/1-83	Comp	Bastogne	Veghel	2 Feb 71
HQ Btry 8-4	NA	Lang Chanh	Lang Giao	3 Feb 71
SVC Btry 8-4	NA	Lang Chanh	Lang Giao	3 Feb 71
A/8-4	4X175	Lang Chanh	Lang Giao	3 Feb 71
B/8-4	4X175	Lang Chanh	Lang Giao	3 Feb 71
C/8-4	4X8"	Lang Chanh	Lang Giao	3 Feb 71
HHB 108th Gp (Fwd)	NA	Lang Chanh	Lang Con	4 Feb 71
HQ Btry 2-94	NA	Vandegrift	Lang Con	4 Feb 71
SVC Btry 2-94	NA	Vandegrift	Lang Con	4 Feb 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Bong Kha	Lang Con	4 Feb 71
B/2-94	4X175	Vandegrift	Lang Con	4 Feb 71
C/2-94	4X175	Vandegrift	Lang Con	4 Feb 71

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TUBES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DATE</u>
C/8-4	4X8"	Lang Giao	Lao Bao	7 Feb 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Lang Con	Lao Bao	7 Feb 71
B/8-4	4X175	Lang Giao	Lao Bao	8 Feb 71
HQ Btry 8-4	NA	Lang Giao	Lao Bao	9 Feb 71
SVC Btry 8-4	NA	Lang Giao	Lao Bao	9 Feb 71
HQ Btry 8-4	NA	Lao Bao	By Hien	9 Feb 71
SVC Btry 8-4	NA	Lao Bao	By Hien	9 Feb 71
A/8-4	4X175	Lang Giao	Lao Bao	9 Feb 71
A/8-4	4X175	Lao Bao	By Hien	9 Feb 71
B/8-4	4X175	Lao Bao	By Hien	9 Feb 71
C/8-4	4X8"	Lao Bao	By Hien	9 Feb 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Lao Bao	By Hien	9 Feb 71
A/8-4	4X175	By Hien	Sa Tiac	10 Feb 71
C/1-39	4X8"	Carroll	A-4	10 Feb 71
B/8-4	4X175	By Hien	Lao Bao	11 Feb 71
A/2-94	4X8"	By Hien	Lac Bao	11 Feb 71
B/1-39	4X175	C-1	A-1	12 Feb 71
B/1-39	4X175	A-1	C-1	12 Feb 71
C/1-39	4X8"	A-4	Carroll	13 Feb 71
C/8-4	4X8"	By Hien	Lang Giao	14 Feb 71
B/1-83	Comp	Birmingham	Bastogne	15 Feb 71
HHB 108th Gp	NA (Fwd)	Lang Con	Ku Bac	17 Feb 71
B/1-83	Comp	Bastogne	Birmingham	20 Feb 71

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TUBES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DATE</u>
B/1-83	Comp	Birmingham	Veghel	21 Feb 71
B/1-83	Comp	Veghel	Carroll	24 Feb 71
C/1-39	4X8"	Carroll	A-4	24 Feb 71
B/8-4	4X175	Lao Bao	Sa Tiac	26 Feb 71
C/2-94	4X175	Lang Con	Lao Bao	26 Feb 71
B/8-4	4X175	Sa Tiac	Lang Giao	28 Feb 71
HQ Btry/8-4	NA	By Hien	Lang Giao	1 Mar 71
SVC Btry/8-4	NA	By Hien	Lang Giao	1 Mar 71
B/1-39	4X175	C-1	Lang Con	1 Mar 71
A/1-83	2X8"	Veghel	Rakkasan	2 Mar 71
A/8-4	4X175	Sa Tiac	Lang Giao	5 Mar 71
B/2-94	4X175	Lang Con	Lao Bao	5 Mar 71
B/1-39	4X175	Lang Con	Lao Bao	5 Mar 71
A/8-4	4X175	Lang Giao	Lao Bao	7 Mar 71
B/8-4	4X175	Lang Giao	Ta Puc	9 Mar 71
A/1-83	2X175	Veghel	Bastogne	15 Mar 71
A/8-4	4X175	Lao Bao	Lang Giao	18 Mar 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Lao Bao	By Hien	18 Mar 71
B/2-94	4X175	Lao Bao	Lang Con	18 Mar 71
B/8-4	4X175	Ta Puc	Lang Giao	20 Mar 71
A/2-94	4X8"	By Hien	Lang Con	20 Mar 71
C/2-94	4X175	Lao Bao	Lang Con	21 Mar 71
B/1-39	4X175	Lao Bao	Lang Con	21 Mar 71

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TUBES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DATE</u>
HQ Btry 2-94	NA	Lang Con	Vandegrift	25 Mar 71
SVC Btry 2-94	NA	Lang Con	Vandegrift	25 Mar 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Lang Con	Lang Giao	25 Mar 71
B/2-94	2X175	Lang Con	Vandegrift	25 Mar 71
C/2-94	4X175	Lang Con	Vandegrift	25 Mar 71
B/2-94	2X175	Lang Con	Vandegrift	26 Mar 71
B/1-39	4X175	Lang Con	Vandegrift	26 Mar 71
HHB 108th Gp (Fwd)	NA	Ku Bac	Carroll	31 Mar 71
B/8-4	4X175	Lang Giao	Khe Ghio	31 Mar 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Lang Giao	Vandegrift	31 Mar 71
HQ Btry/8-4	NA	Lang Giao	Khe Ghio	3 Apr 71
SVC Btry/8-4	NA	Lang Giao	Khe Ghio	3 Apr 71
A/8-4	4X175	Lang Giao	Khe Ghio	3 Apr 71
C/8-4	4X8"	Lang Giao	Khe Ghio	3 Apr 71
A/1-83	2X8"	Rakkasan	Bastogne	3 Apr 71
HQ Btry 2-94	NA	Vandegrift	Mai Loc	5 Apr 71
SVC Btry 2-94	NA	Vandegrift	Mai Loc	5 Apr 71
HHB XXIV Corps Arty (Fwd)	NA	Quang Tri	Da Nang	5 Apr 71
B/2-94	4X175	Vandegrift	Mai Loc	5 Apr 71
C/2-94	4X175	Vandegrift	Mai Loc	5 Apr 71

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TUBES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DATE</u>
B/1-39	4X175	Vandegrift	C-1	5 Apr 71
A/8-4	4X175	Khe Ghio	Mai Loc	6 Apr 71
A/2-94	4X8"	Vandegrift	Mai Loc	7 Apr 71
HHB/1-39 (FWD)	NA	Dong Ha	Nancy	8 Apr 71
HQ Btry/ 8-4	NA	Khe Ghio	Dong Ha	8 Apr 71
SVC Btry/ 8-4	NA	Khe Ghio	Dong Ha	8 Apr 71
C/1-39	4X8"	A-4	Carroll	8 Apr 71
B/1-83	Comp	Carroll	Birmingham	8 Apr 71
C/1-83	Comp	C-2	Rakkasan	8 Apr 71
HHB 108th Gp (FWD)	NA	Carroll	Nancy	9 Apr 71

(g) The following Battle Damage Assessment Statistics for XXIV Corps Artillery, resulted for the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971.

<u>TARGET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Bunkers Destroyed	27
Bunkers Damaged	117
Structures Destroyed	385
Structures Damaged	104
Antiaircraft Weapons Destroyed	2
Antiaircraft Positions Destroyed	12
Mortars Destroyed	2
Rockets Destroyed	2

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<u>TARGET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Automatic Weapons Destroyed	10
Automatic Weapons Damaged	1
Killed By Artillery (Confirmed)	1750
Killed By Artillery (Probable)	153
Sampans Destroyed	19
Vehicles Destroyed	43
Bridges Destroyed	9
Bridges Damaged	2
Secondary Fires	22
Secondary Explosions	292
Meters of Trench Destroyed	340
Supply and Storage Destroyed	4
Antennas Destroyed	1
Antennas Damaged	3

(h) Naval Gunfire Support.

1 During this period, thirteen ships were assigned to MR 1 for Naval Gunfire Support. One Royal Australian ship and twelve US Navy ships operated on the gunline.

2 In spite of the low number of observed missions as compared to unobserved missions (190 to 5,977), naval gunfire can continue to play a worthwhile role providing general support reinforcing fires for MR 1. Emphasis has been placed on the mobility concept of naval gunfire by permitting more latitude for movement of the asset within MR 1. The equivalent of a reinforced battery can be moved from the southern part of MR 1 to the DMZ in approximately six hours. By maximizing this advantage of mobility, naval gunfire can engage coastal targets anywhere in MR 1.

3 The overall round expenditure for this period was 16,682 with the following significant GDA:

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<u>TARGET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
KIA (Confirmed)	2
KIA (Probable)	0
WIA	3
Structures	9
Bunkers Destroyed	20
Bunkers Damaged	23
Secondary Explosions	31
Waterborne Logistics Craft Destroyed	2

(i) Target Acquisition Activities.

1 Addition of AN/TPQ-34, Long Range Ground Surveillance Radar.

a During this reporting period F Battery, 26th Artillery (Target Acquisition) installed and began utilizing the AN/TPQ-34, Long Range Ground Surveillance Radar. With a maximum range of 20,000 meters for both vehicles and personnel, the AN/TPQ-34 significantly increased the target acquisition capabilities of the target acquisition battery. The AN/TPQ-34 arrived on site at Strong Point A-4 on 19 November 1970. The system was completely installed by 26 November 1970. Complete system checkout by both Army AN/TPQ-34 operators and the factory technical representative was completed on 9 December 1970. The system was declared operational at 100000H December 1970. The AN/TPQ-34 radar has been extremely reliable. Although some problems in maintenance and supply have arisen, nonoperational time has been minimal and the radar has been very effective in detecting targets.

b Detections made by the AN/TPQ-34 have ranged from 1500 meters to 20,000 meters. Targets have been classified as personnel, vehicle, or sampans. Approximate numbers of each of these type targets are made, but exact numbers are not possible.

c Presently XXIV Corps Artillery is preparing to deploy another AN/TPQ-34 radar to FSB Nancy. This radar will provide coverage of main enemy infiltration routes to Quang Tri Province and the lowlands.

2 Additional Integrated Observation Systems (IOS) Assets.

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a During January 1971, two new IOSs were assigned to XXIV Corps. Both of these were further assigned to the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl).

b During late March 1971, the 1st Marine Division began turning over their IOS assets to USARV. The first two of these IOSs were assigned to the 23d Infantry Division for employment at OP 1 and OP 3. A third IOS was turned over in place on FSB 65 (Rawhide) on 13 April 1971. On 15 April 1971, F Battery, 26th Artillery took over a fourth IOS to be employed in northern Quang Tri Province at FSB Sarge.

c Two more IOSs will be assigned to the 23d Infantry Division for employment in Quang Nam Province.

3 New Adoptions on IOS: In mid April this headquarters received two modifications for the IOS for a 90 day evaluation. These two modifications are a biocular eyepiece for the night observation device (NOD) and an extended range device for the NOD. The biocular eyepiece enables the operator to stand back from the NOD and look with both eyes. This will help eliminate the present operator eye fatigue problem. The extended range device doubles the range capability of the present NOD. With this device the range of the NOD will be 6-8km. The 90 day evaluation of these devices will be accomplished by F Battery, 26th Artillery.

(j) Following is a listing of the numbers of meteorological soundings checked during the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971 with results as indicated:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SOUNDINGS CHECKED</u>	<u>NUMBER UNSATISFACTORY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE UNSATISFACTORY</u>
NOVEMBER	120	0	0.0%
DECEMBER	114	3	2.6%
JANUARY	84	1	1.2%
FEBRUARY	108	5	4.6%
MARCH	72	4	5.6%
APRIL	72	4	5.6%

(k) Friendly Fire Incidents: The following Fire incidents were reported in MR 1 during the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971.

1 Number of Incidents.

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AERIAL FIELD</u>			<u>NAVAL GUN FIRE</u>
	<u>ARTILLERY</u>	<u>MORTAR</u>	<u>ARTILLERY</u>	
NOVEMBER	5	0	0	0
DECEMBER	2	2	0	0
JANUARY	4	4	0	0
FEBRUARY	2	3	0	0
MARCH	7	1	0	0
APRIL	3	0	0	0

2 Casualties.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>US KILLED</u>	<u>US WOUNDED</u>	<u>OTHER KILLED</u>	<u>OTHER WOUNDED</u>	<u>TOTAL KILLED</u>	<u>TOTAL WOUNDED</u>
NOVEMBER	0	8	0	0	0	8
DECEMBER	9	15	2	10	11	25
JANUARY	3	14	1	1	4	15
FEBRUARY	0	9	2	7	2	16
MARCH	4	16	1	1	5	17
APRIL	6	6	0	0	6	6

(1) Training: In November 1970, XXIV Corps Artillery was tasked to train ARVN personnel for the 101st Artillery Battalion (ARVN) (175mm Gun). After approval of a training program, 16 ARVN cadre began training on 15 March 1971. On 19 April 1971 the ARVN cadre initiated instruction for 15 fire direction control and 66 firing battery personnel at FSB Carroll; 9 Metro personnel at FSB Nancy; and 42 drivers and mechanics at FSB Carroll, FSB Nancy, and other locations. During the OJT portion of the program, US personnel were available to supervise and advise as necessary. It is currently planned that equipment will be issued to the unit on 1 July 1971 and that deployment will be some time prior to 1 December 1971.

(m) Firing Battery Inspection Team (FBIT): Eight firing battery inspections have been conducted by the XXIV Corps Artillery FBIT during the reporting period. Only one inspection has shown unsatisfactory results. Results of these inspections has indicated that, while the inspected units have been capable of accomplishing assigned missions, equipment shortages,

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inexperienced personnel, and maintenance have limited that capability in some cases for short periods of time.

(n) TAADS Documentation Update: Phase I of the TAADS MTOE Documentation Update was completed on 20 January 1971. The first Corps Artillery unit submitted a detailed MTOE update as a part of Phase II on 27 February 1971. By the end of the reporting period, over 71% of the Corps Artillery units had submitted the required Phase II updated MTOE documents.

(o) In November 1970, a Bulk Petroleum Management System was established which implemented budgetary limits for units utilizing aviation and ground fuels. Quantities are established through projected quantities submitted to Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

(p) Headquarters, USARV discontinued Command Maintenance Management Inspections (CMI), by message on 3 December 1970. Although this requirement has been deleted; the USARV team will continue to conduct roadside spot checks.

(q) During the period 9-14 April 1971, phase I of a maintenance upgrading program was instituted. The initial Corps Artillery units involved were the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery and the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery. Technical inspection teams were provided by Direct Support Units and Assistant Chief of Staff Maintenance, Da Nang Support Command. Preliminary reports indicate 1st and 2d echelon maintenance is not being performed. Due to the success of this program, a program for a monthly maintenance standdown beginning 1 May 1971 is being submitted for approval.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, Recommendations, and Command Actions.

a. Personnel.

(1) Manpower rotation for Imagery Interpretation Branch.

(a) Observation: Continuity of effort is mandatory for continuous intelligence production through imagery interpretation.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel in an Imagery Interpretation Branch must be highly skilled and well trained. A familiarization period of approximately two months is required to orient new personnel to a Corps area of interest so they are capable of gleaning all possible intelligence from the photography they examine.

(c) Recommendation: Commanders should note the above evaluation and require timely replacement of personnel in their imagery interpretation branches.

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(2) Financial support for personnel.

(a) Observation: Civilian personnel salaries are funded jointly by the Director, Special Services Agency, Headquarters, USARV; the Joint Services Nonappropriated Welfare Fund, and individual Central Post Funds operated by subzone coordinators.

(b) Evaluation: There appears to be an over reliance on use of non-appropriated funds. Only a small percentage of employees are funded through appropriated funds. However, appropriated funds for personnel, supplies, and services are only available at Headquarters, USARV.

(c) Recommendation: That additional appropriated funds and personnel ceilings be provided to allow more appropriated fund support for Special Services operations.

(d) Command Actions: A letter has been forwarded to Headquarters, USARV, recommending a review of expenditures by welfare funds in support of Special Services operations be made with a view toward the concept of including these expenditures in the appropriated fund budget of the Director, Special Services Agency.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Imagery interpretation responsibilities.

(a) Observation: The G2 Air Officer at XXIV Corps (Forward) Command Post during Operation Lam Son 719 managed the aerial reconnaissance mission requests. As such he was further required to provide imagery to requestors at the command post before the Imagery Interpretation Branch was allowed to interpret the film. These requestors did not have the requisite knowledge required to adequately perform interpretation.

(b) Evaluation: The Imagery Interpretation Branch is the only agency in a tactical command post capable of properly analyzing imagery.

(c) Recommendation: The G2 Air Officer of a forward headquarters should be allowed to process reconnaissance requests and imagery readouts through established agencies responsible for intelligence processing.

(2) Use of imagery interpretation intelligence data.

(a) Observation: Aerial photography can supply valuable and reliable intelligence data, however during the planning phase of Operation Lam Son 719 the Imagery Interpretation Branch of G2 Air Division was not tasked for intelligence data.

(b) Evaluation: The vast store of intelligence data contained on the

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data bases of the Imagery Interpretation Branch were not consulted for planning of a Corps operation. This means men who knew the area of operation, enemy trends of movement, and enemy fortifications in the area were not tasked for this valuable intelligence information. Additional intelligence available with the data base included the following type targets: truck parks, supply bunkers, storage areas, antiaircraft artillery, and antiaircraft automatic weapons positions.

(c) Recommendation: The Imagery Interpretation Branch should be consulted for intelligence information as early as possible during the planning phase of any future operation.

(d) Command Action: During future operations every available source will be tasked for its library of intelligence.

c. Operations.

(1) Traffic accidents.

(a) Observation: During upgrading operations on a newly established truck bypass in Da Nang City, several accidents occurred wherein Vietnamese pedestrians were struck by US vehicles in the refugee villages located along the route. Two of these accidents involved large trucks hauling gravel and construction materials for the upgrading operation.

(b) Evaluation: The primary cause of the accidents was determined to be the close proximity of the buildings and structures to the roadbed. In many cases, the houses were so situated that the occupants stepped out of their doorways onto the road. Children ran into the road from between houses and were in the path of oncoming vehicles before they could be noticed.

(c) Recommendation: That every effort be made to exercise control over the establishment of new refugee villages and require a minimum 10 feet buffer area between the roadway and the homes. In established refugee villages, reconstruction should be required to establish the suggested buffer area. In any new construction, in all villages, the buffer area should be a mandatory requirement for the safety of the villagers.

(2) Adaptability of Commando Car V-100 (XM-706).

(a) Observation: The V-100 (XM-706) Commando Car was the primary escort vehicle used by the Military Police during Operation Lam Son 719.

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This vehicle did not prove to be suitable for operating routinely along the Ca Lu - Khe Sanh defile.

(b) Evaluation: During the early phase of the operation (approximately 3 weeks) the maneuverability of the V-100, was extremely hampered by mud and large holes in the road from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh caused by poor weather. The vehicles were further limited due to the width of the road along certain sections which prevented them from turning around. For example, if a convoy was attacked and the V-100 was not in the kill zone, the driver could not turn the vehicle around to render assistance.

(c) Recommendation: Prior to commitment of the V-100s, a ground reconnaissance should be made to ascertain that the road network affords sufficient space for the efficient operation of the vehicle. During periods of extended wet weather, when the road network becomes extremely muddy, rough, and pot holed, the V-100s should be replaced with tracked vehicles.

(3) Artillery clearances for Tactical Air Reconnaissance.

(a) Observation: Artillery clearance for reconnaissance aircraft is only as effective as the communications between the aircraft and the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). US Air Force aircraft are equipped with UHF, VHF, and HF capability while the FSCC has FM capability only. All communication between the aircraft requesting clearance and the FSCC must be relayed through the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), which is normally located in the division or separate brigade TOC. When the two agencies are not collocated, some means of communication must be established, either FM or wire.

(b) Evaluation: The US Air Force TACP was not established for the purpose of clearing reconnaissance aircraft. The US Air Force radio operator will however, relay communications for the aircraft, but at times of heavy traffic flow, the radio operator is unable to do more than relay a request to the FSCC. Direct communication is needed between the FSCC and the aircraft to accommodate changes in time on target (TOT) or target areas.

(c) Recommendation: The FSCC should be provided with a radio system (UHF) that is capable of establishing direct communications with the aircraft.

(d) Command Actions: The unit (division) G2 Air personnel who requested these missions have been instructed to actively follow reconnaissance missions from TOT notification to target completion. The unit G2 Air should receive the frag order and notify the TACP and FSCC. There

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are two alternate methods of clearing aircraft; the first is to clear the target areas for the TCTs in the frag order when it is received. This method of clearance in advance is the easiest method to implement but is dependent upon the aircraft arriving on target at exactly the TOT given in the frag order. The other alternative method is to treat the frag order as a guide to estimated TOTs. Under this system, the unit requires the aircraft to contact the ground 15 minutes prior to arriving on target. The decision to halt artillery fire is ultimately in the hands of the ground commander. The unit G2 Air representative should be available when the aircraft reports and should pass the information to the FSCC and receive the clearance for the aircraft.

(4) Employment of aerial observers in US Air Force forward air controller (FAC) aircraft.

(a) Observation: During recent operations in areas of high enemy activity there has been a marked need for extensive aerial visual reconnaissance against enemy artillery.

(b) Evaluation: In many cases artillery aerial observers are available when Army aircraft are not available to fly them. Extra aerial observers can accompany US Air Force forward air controllers in the rear seat of their aircraft. By employing observers in this manner the aerial observer gains more experience in the air and the US Air Force FACs gain a better appreciation for the employment of artillery.

(c) Recommendation: Commanders should exploit every opportunity available to employ artillery aerial observers on joint missions with US Air Force FACs.

(5) Logistic support of O-1 aircraft during displacement.

(a) Observation: Combat requirements for visual reconnaissance in different areas require that O-1 aircraft be scheduled to permit the aviation unit to launch the aircraft on more than one sortie per day. Therefore, rescheduling of sorties, positioning of aircraft, and logistic support available for the aircraft become critical factors that must be considered.

(b) Evaluation: Relocation of aircraft to a site closer to the supported unit requirements involves more than just flying the aircraft to that site. Aircraft POL and maintenance facilities must be planned in advance of the actual move so these facilities are operational when the aircraft arrives. During Lam Son 719, aircraft were moved to Khe Sanh only to find no parking space available when they landed. Also, there was no aviation gasoline or oil for the aircraft. It took

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approximately seven days for the aviation company to provide the required logistical support.

(c) Recommendation: When prior planning is possible, every effort must be made by the supporting aviation organization to arrange for required logistical support, in anticipation of displacement to support ground operations.

(d) Command Action: This requirement has been brought to the attention of the aviation units concerned.

(6) Aerial imagery delivery.

(a) Observation: During Operation Lam Son 719, delivery of high priority film to the requesting unit was not always timely enough for tactical needs.

(b) Evaluation: Film given special handling was often late in arrival.

(c) Recommendation: Close monitoring of the film developing and delivery process should be maintained. Both the Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) and the Military Intelligence Battalion Air Reconnaissance Support (MIBARS) should make daily status reports of the film as they are handling it. Once the film is turned over to MIBARS, the film mission number, date, and addressee should be on the invoice and also marked on the package. Most important, the MIBARS should have an individual who can be contacted concerning the film location enroute and estimated time of delivery to the requestor.

(d) Command Action: MIBARS and TASE have been apprised of this situation.

(7) Night O-1 visual reconnaissance capability.

(a) Observation: A night artillery watch was attempted during the reporting period in an attempt to locate enemy artillery by visual sighting of gun flashes.

(b) Evaluation: The O-1 aircraft is restricted by visual flight rules because it has minimum instrumentation. This gives the aircraft limited night position fixing capability. Pilots have difficulty determining coordinates at night when they are not in visual contact with the ground and prominent terrain features. Therefore, the employment of the aircraft in a night artillery watch role produced no profitable results. When night visual flight rule (VFR) conditions exist during periods of high lunar illumination it should be possible to obtain worthwhile results.

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(c) Recommendation: O-1 aircraft should be used in night visual reconnaissance/artillery watch role only when VFR conditions exist.

(8) Employment of imagery during an operation.

(a) Observation: The Imagery Interpretation Branch was not briefed on Operation Lam Son 719 prior to its start.

(b) Evaluation: The II Branch was not informed of the upcoming operation. Consequently, imagery on hand was not the most recent in the area of interest for the operation.

(c) Recommendation: For future operations in which imagery interpretation will play a vital role, advance notification should be provided to the section. Every and all missions over the area of operation should have a priority for interpretation and should be kept for future reference. Also, additional missions should be requested over those areas in the AO which may not have been covered by previous missions on hand or were of very poor quality or scale for interpretation.

(d) Command Action: When aerial photography is to play a role in an operation, the G2 Air should be briefed on information needed for planning and provide this information to the imagery interpreter.

(9) Use of an Imagery Interpretation Branch as a map depot.

(a) Observation: The II Branch was utilized as a map depot during Operation Lam Son 719.

(b) Evaluation: The Imagery Interpretation Branch was required to inventory approximately 50,000 maps for the operation. Due to the magnitude of this requirement much time was taken away from imagery interpretation.

(c) Recommendation: For future operations the correct maps and the exact number of maps should be inventoried and shipped from the map depot directly to the using units. This would save time and manhours, and the possibility of loss and/or error would be reduced.

(d) Command Action: For future operations, commanders of units involved should inventory their basic load to determine the number of maps needed and a priority request for maps should be submitted to the supporting depot for shipment directly to the unit.

(10) Aircraft requesting procedures.

(a) Observation: During Operation Lam Son 719, it was recognized

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that there was an excessive number of immediate type aircraft requests.

(b) Evaluation: XXIV Corps Aviation SOP requires that an aircraft request be submitted prior to 1500 hours the day before the mission is to be flown. It is recognized that due to the tactical situation, many times this requirement is impossible to meet. However, many immediate type requests would have been routine requests if aviation staff planning was timely.

(c) Recommendation: That subordinate commanders who require the use of Corps Aviation assets insure that unit staff planning include aviation requirements and that mission requests be submitted.

(d) Command Action: This requirement has been disseminated to all concerned.

(11) Release of information.

(a) Observation: The release of timely and factual information at the lowest level possible is the best defense against speculation and inaccurate reporting on the part of the press.

(b) Evaluation: Provisions of MACV Directive 360-1, dated 27 March 1970, which dictates that COMUSMACV is the sole clearance and releasing authority of information concerning US military operations, precludes on-the-scene release of timely information. This was a source of irritation to the correspondents who were in the area of operations during Lam Son 719. The delay involved in obtaining clearance from MACV, which sometimes took hours, was invariably interpreted by correspondents as a "stalling" tactic, and was a source of antagonism from the very beginning.

(c) Recommendation: In future operations of the magnitude of Lam Son 719, MACV should either delegate release authority to the senior US commander on the scene, or send a MACV team to the area of operations to act as the MACV releasing authority.

(12) Correspondent transportation.

(a) Observation: Travel restrictions imposed on correspondents during the initial phases of Lam Son 719, particularly the ruling which prohibited newsmen from traveling into Laos aboard US helicopters, became a major cause of consternation and ill feeling on the part of the press.

(b) Evaluation: At the time this initial restrictive ruling was modified to allow newsmen to go into Laos aboard dedicated press helicopters, the tactical situation had changed to the point that responsible ARVN commanders were reluctant to allow them to do so because of their concern for the safety of newsmen as well as the safety of the dedicated helicopters and crews.

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(c) Recommendation: Within the confines of military security and non-interference with military operations, correspondents should be allowed access to all modes of transportation into and out of the area of operation. Restrictions on their movement should be kept to an absolute minimum.

(13) Airfield matting.

(a) Observation: Rapid repair and replacement of airfield matting presents problems which are not readily resolved with currently available techniques, equipment, and materials.

(b) Evaluation: Lam Son 719 gave engineer units with little previous experience the opportunity to evaluate the entire scope of airfield matting employment: supply, transportation, laying, repairing battle and operational damage, and removal.

1 Supply and transportation.

a Matting was shipped into Khe Sanh in support of Lam Son 719 by multiple means from various points in Vietnam, Korea, Okinawa, and CONUS to meet this emergency requirement. Due to the many different shipments, sometimes arriving unannounced, the Support Command personnel were unable to inventory and account for all material as it moved in and out of air heads and supply points. As a result, some of the critically needed landing mat panels ended up in bunker construction.

b With a mixture of new bundles of matting and used panels in non-standard bundles, some with and some without locking bars, it was difficult for the construction unit to plan orderly operations. Repacked bundles frequently arrived less the locking bars which had to be located and shipped to the site. No standard matting anchors were received. Therefore improvised anchors were made using six foot "U" pickets with the top six inches bent over the edge of the matting. Angle iron welded to the top of the "U" pickets was also employed. Each of these expedients required continuous maintenance. The solution to this problem is rigid inventory and control of airfield matting at a central depot.

2 Removal and replacement of damaged matting.

a The initial attempts to remove damaged AM2 matting in the existing runway by the sawing method as recommended in TM 5-337 proved too slow and required frequent changing of blades. Carbide tipped blades were not initially available and carbocrundum blades did not hold up. The 27th Engineer Combat Battalion resorted to arc cutting and to using the jack hammer chisel point attachment. This proved more rapid but did not leave clean edges for replacement panels.

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b The most effective and efficient method of repair of AM2 matting was to push an entire row of panels out of the runway, laterally, and slide in replacement panels. This was done using a dozer grouser shoe on the end panel to protect the edge and pushing with a bucket loader or M450 airmobile dozer. Once this method was adopted, the speed of repair was measurably increased.

c The replacement of MX19 panels was found to be more difficult than the AM2. Being locked on all four sides, the panel had to be cut or the entire area taken up to get to the damaged panel. Again, the saw blade method was slow, so the arc weld cut was used. Replacement panel kits were not available initially and had to be flown in from Korea. Panel removal is the controlling factor in the time required to repair a damaged section.

3 Matting repair. For the repair of the existing shell damaged AM2 runway, small holes were initially patched using a sand cement mix while larger holes, over four inches, were repaired by welding an aluminum plate over the hole. Neither of these methods were successful as the moving load of the aircraft caused the "sandcrete" plugs to pop out and the welds to frequently break. The MX19 runway was damaged by a C-130 aircraft that lost a wheel on landing and the protruding axle caused a 1700 foot long tear down the centerline of the runway. To replace the 395 panels damaged in the incident would have required picking up and relaying most of the matting. It was decided to try epoxy cement to fill the tear which had not gone through the bottom skin of the panel surface. Initially pure epoxy cement was used but it was too fluid and difficult to work. Various ratios of sand/epoxy mixtures were tried. For the larger patches, a mix ratio of 3 sand to 1 epoxy by volume was found to be best. For smaller areas and dents, a 1 to 1 ratio was used. The epoxy repair was successful and 30 panels with a tear width up to 5 inches held up under continuous C-130 traffic until the runway was removed. As a result of this success, all holes resulting from shell fragments were deburred and filled with the sand/epoxy mixture. This greatly expedited minor repairs.

4 Removal and packaging. Removal of the AM2 taxiways and MX19 runway was only a matter of manpower and job organization. The banding of standard bundles was complicated by periodic enemy shelling of the runway. As a result of this, the panels were not carefully surveyed for damage or cleaned prior to banding. The bundles were shipped to the Da Nang Depot on C-130 aircraft using the AM2 runway which had to be left in place due to the tactical situation.

(c) Recommendations.

1 That complete sets of matting, sufficient for a specific length runway be stocked at designated depots. In addition to the matting, a complete set of equipment for repair should be stocked in the package.

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This should include, cutting saws with extra carbide tipped blades, aluminum welding equipment, and epoxy cement.

2 That rigid controls be established for the issue and use of airfield matting, MX19, AM2, and M8A1 to prevent the usage of matting in bunker construction, walkways, etc. Damaged matting could be made available for these purposes.

3 That appropriate R&D agencies investigate the problem of expeditiously removing damaged panels. Consideration should be given to the design of a matting panel which is simple and rapid to remove without having to pick-up and relay large sections.

4 That appropriate R&D agencies investigate expedient patching methods such as aluminum welding, epoxy cement, plastics, and joint sealers. Patching methods should be developed and the required materials collocated with the matting stocks.

(14) Tactical Information Deposit and Retrieval (TINDER) System.

(a) Observation: III Marine Amphibious Force has been using the TINDER system for over a year. XXIV Corps Artillery recently became aware of the targeting potential of this computerized system. The system stores all types of target information. Printouts of target lists, overlays, or weighted target listing are produced within 15 minutes of the users request.

(b) Evaluation: The computer system (TINDER) is a huge step forward toward faster more effective targeting. The potential of the system is tremendous. The recent addition of a program that evaluates target information and then prints out targets by priority has made the system an ideal means of targeting.

(c) Recommendation: That the TINDER system be adopted by the Army and used for targeting in MR 1.

(d) Command Action: XXIV Corps Artillery has contacted both Force Logistics Command (FLC), US Marine Corps and Da Nang Army Depot to coordinate the turnover of the system. Depot Data Processing Center will begin running the program for XXIV Corps Artillery as soon as the system is made compatible with Depot computers.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training.

(1) Arc Light Orientation Course.

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(a) Observation: During Operation Lam Son 719, 8 February through 7 April 1971, there were several occasions when insufficient knowledge of Arc Light procedures by Allied and US units could have lead to a downgrading of Arc Light effectiveness of the overall mission.

(b) Evaluation: It became apparent that many individuals within the framework of Arc Light operations lacked knowledge of the fundamental techniques of Arc Light targeting and operations. It is basic to any Arc Light operation to have personnel with a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities and limitations of this complex weapons system. If everyone involved with Arc Light targeting and operations planning had an appreciation of the weapons system, a more efficient use of Arc Light could be made.

(c) Recommendation: There is great need for the establishment of an Arc Light targeting and operations training course to be conducted at the MACV command level. Of primary interest is providing all G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3 Arc Light personnel at corps and division levels (including MACV Advisory Personnel) with a working knowledge of Arc Light functions. An Arc Light orientation course would be of benefit to all US personnel in MR 1 and all of Southeast Asia presently supported by the existing Arc Light system.

(d) Command Action: A request is being prepared from CG, XXIV Corps to COMUSMACV recommending establishment of such an orientation course.

f. Logistics.

(1) M4 Blasting Cap Assembly.

(a) Observation: In December 1970, it was noticed that combat units were drawing claymores with accessories (DODIC K143) to obtain the M4 blasting cap assembly which is an integral part thereof.

(b) Evaluation:

1 The M4 blasting cap assembly is also a separate item of issue (DODIC M078).

2 This item has been at or near 0 balance in MR 1 for several months.

(c) Recommendation: Both ammunition items (K143 and M078) should be stocked in MR 1 in sufficient quantity to meet operational requirements.

(d) Command Action: A command letter with the above recommendation was forwarded to USARV. Information has been received that the M4 blasting cap assembly will be available in MR 1 by May 1971.

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(2) POL Handling Equipment.

(a) Observation: During planning for Operation Lam Son 719, it was noted that sufficient stocks of POL handling and distribution type equipment were not available.

(b) Evaluation:

1 These items were obtained from outside MR 1 and the operation was not delayed. However, had they not been made available, the operation would have been drastically modified.

2 Furthermore, any operation requiring the opening of new helicopter refuel points and/or forward support areas, would have been similarly affected.

(c) Recommendation: That stock status of POL handling equipment and distribution of equipment be monitored more closely.

(d) Command Action: This headquarters has started monitoring the stock status within USASUPCOM, Da Nang of these type items.

(3) Retrograde Operations.

(a) Observation: The planning for evacuation of damaged equipment during Operation Lam Son 719 was incomplete.

(b) Evaluation:

1 The lack of sufficient assets, the operational status of retrograded equipment, and the lack of a clear concept of the magnitude of the work involved, resulted in a serious retrograde problem. Additional equipment had to be brought forward in order to augment available resources.

2 A letter of instruction covering retrograde operations was not published until 11 March 1971.

(c) Recommendation: The evacuation of material must be minutely planned. It must fully consider road conditions and the possible augmentation of available assets.

(d) Command Action: In planning future operations this area will be closely coordinated.

(4) Power Supply for V-100 (XM-706) Commando Car.

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(a) Observation: The V-100 Commando Car's armament system and brakes are dependent upon the power generated by the output of the running engine. When the engine is not running, these systems will not function, leaving the crew virtually defenseless. When the vehicle is being towed, these systems do not function.

(b) Evaluation: During Operation Lam Son 719, one incident occurred which resulted in one MP KIA, and 6 MP WIA. A disabled V-100 was being towed to a safe area by another V-100. Because of the non-functioning power brake system, a result of inability to start the engine, the driver of the V-100 being towed was using the clutch and gears to slow down when necessary to avoid striking the towing vehicle. When the clutch became so hot it was feared it would cause a fire, the vehicles halted and attempted to cool the clutch and send for additional recovery equipment. While at the halt, the vehicles and crews came under enemy indirect and direct fire. One MP was killed as the towed V-100 took a direct hit. This round also severed the tow line. The commander of the lead V-100 ordered his driver to immediately proceed and clear the killing zone. The driver drove rapidly away, not realizing he was leaving the other vehicle behind. The crippled vehicle's crew, unable to start the engine could not use the weapons system or radio. They did return fire with their individual weapons and received some cover by taking refuge in the vehicle but they were largely ineffective as a fighting force. The V-100 crew that had been leading returned as soon as the absence of the towed vehicle was noticed and rescued the crew of the crippled Commando Car, all of which were by then WIA.

(c) Recommendation: That the manufacturer of the V-100 Commando Car be tasked to develop a system that will operate the vehicle's organic weapons, automotive, and communication systems from an auxiliary source of power when the vehicle is not operating.

g. Communications.

(1) Corps Aviation Section Communication Equipment.

(a) Observation: XXIV Corps Aviation Section has no authorized communication equipment.

(b) Evaluation: During Operation Lam Son 719, the communication necessary to operate the Army Aviation Element (AAE) of the XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center (Forward) was provided by the Corps Signal Officer. The equipment used was provided to Corps on loan from various units participating in the operation. Often the equipment was inoperative, unreliable, or in poor state of maintenance. Adequate communications are requisite to the operation of a Corps AAE and should be authorized by MTOE.

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(c) Recommendation: That aviation sections of division and higher headquarters review their authorization documents to insure they have adequate communication equipment to conduct tactical control of aviation operations.

(d) Command Action: Authorization document for XXIV Corps Headquarters is currently being reviewed for restructure processing in accordance with AR 310-49.

(2) Log Periodic Antenna AS-2236.

(a) Observation: The US Marine Corps utilizes an antenna for FM radio communication which has very high transmission reliability.

(b) Evaluation: The use of FM radio with secure capability (RT - 524 w/KY-8) was critical during the reporting period. The US Marine Corps Log Periodic Antenna AS-2236 was used by XXIV Corps Artillery units during Operation Lam Son 719 when it proved to be the most reliable antenna available for use with their FM radio equipment.

(c) Recommendation: That all XXIV Corps Artillery unit MTOEs be restructured to authorize the Log Periodic Antenna AS-2236.

(3) AN/GRC-142 Radio Teletype operation and maintenance.

(a) Observation: The AN/GRC-142 Radio Teletype set proved itself as a most reliable means of communication during the reporting period.

(b) Evaluation: The component equipment comprising the set is highly critical on maintenance. The TT-76/TT-98 teletype machines proved to be a constant source of maintenance problems. Dirt and dust cause significant maintenance problems for these teletype sets as well as the amplifier, modern, and RT unit.

(c) Recommendation: That all AN/GRC-142 Radio Teletype operators be reminded of the importance of keeping the van door closed when trying to prevent maintenance breakdowns. Additionally, recommend a radio teletype repairman with appropriate repair parts be authorized down to and including battalion level.

1. Other.

Preferred enemy rally points.

(a) Observation: The enemy prefers to rally to areas protected by local security forces located outside of fire support bases.

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(b) Evaluation: During the extensive New Year's Truce PSYOP campaigns, it was discovered that the majority of the enemy Chieu Hoi ralliers preferred to rally to areas protected by local security forces outside base perimeters rather than the fire support bases with the illuminating searchlights. The preponderance of ralliers preferred to turn themselves in to ARVN units.

(c) Recommendation: That the above preferences be considered in planning future PSYOP campaigns.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. H. SMITH

CPT, AGC

Asst AG

2 Incl

1. XXIV Corps Troop List
2. Site Map of MR 1

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GPOP-FD (17 May 71) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters
XXIV Corps, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. (Signature)
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)TROOP LIST AS OF 30 APRIL 1971XXIV CORPS

HHC, XXIV Corps
 24th PI Det
 29th Civil Affairs Co
 31st Mil Hist Det
 48th Chemical Det
 108th Trans Co (CAR)
 204th MI Det
 2d Plt, Co B, 504th MP Bn (OPCON)
 HHC, 11th Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) (OPCON)
 212th Avn Bn (OPCON)
 7th PSYOP Bn (GS)
 437th Dental Det (Atchd)
 37th Det, 5th Weather Sqdn (Atchd)

XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY

HHB, XXIV Corps Arty
 1st Bn, 44th Arty (AW)
 Btry G, 29th Arty (SLT)
 Btry G, 65th Arty (MG)
 2d Bn, 94th Arty (8"/175mm) (SP)
 250 FA RAD Det
 Btry F, 26th Arty (TAB)
 235 FA RAD Det
 239 FA RAD Det
 240 FA RAD Det
 245 FA RAD Det
 274 FA RAD Det
 HHB, 108th Arty Gp
 8th Bn, 4th Arty (8"/175mm) (SP)
 1st Bn, 39th Arty (8"/175mm) (SP)
 1st Bn, 83d Arty (8"/175mm) (SP)

101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AMEL)

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl)
 HHC, 1st Bde
 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
 42d Inf Plt (Sct Dog)

2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl)

HHC, 2d Bde
 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf

INCLOSURE 1

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GROUP 4
 Downgraded at 3 year
 intervals; declassified
 after 12 years

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1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf
3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
47th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)

3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl)

HHC, 3d Bde
3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
58th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)

101st Airborne Division Artillery (Ambl)

HHB, 101st Abn Div Arty (Ambl)
Btry A (Avn), 377th Arty (ARA) (Ambl)
650th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)
2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty (155mm) (T)
2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty (105mm) (T)
2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty (105mm) (T)
1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty (105mm) (T)
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) (-)
268th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
331st Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
388th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)

101st Aviation Group (Cbt) (Ambl)

HHC, 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl)
101st Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl)
499th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
510th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
516th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
527th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl)
159th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
168th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
169th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
273d Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
159th Avn Bn (Aslt Spt Hel) (Ambl)
325th Avn Det
478th Avn Co (Heavy Helicopter)
625th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
327th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
649th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
163d Avn Co (GS) (Ambl)
530th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
359th Avn Det (Div)

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101st Airborne Division Support Command

HHC and Band

5th Trans Bn (Acft Maint & Spt) (Ambl) (-)
326th Med Bn (Ambl) (-)
426th S&S Bn (Ambl) (-)
801st Maint Bn (Ambl) (-)
101st Admin Co (Ambl)

101st Airborne Division (Ambl) Troops

HHC, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav (-)
333d Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
507th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (Ambl)
Co L (Ranger) (Ambl), 75th Inf
326th Engr Bn (Ambl) (-}
501st Sig Bn (Ambl) (-)
101st MP Co (Ambl) (-)
265th Radio Research Co (-)
10th Chemical Plt (DS)
20th Chemical Det (CH Center)
22d Mill Hist Det
25th PI Det (Field Service)
34th PI Det (Field Service)
101st MI Co (Div) (-)
101st PX Det (Prov)
101st Special Scty Det
557th Inf Plt (Cbt Tracker)
20th TASS (USAF) (Det)
Location 6, 5th Weather Det (USAF)

Non-Divisional Units

Det 4, 7th PSYOPS Bn (DS)
7th CA Plt, 29th CA Co (DS)
179th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

23D INFANTRY DIVISION**11th Inf Bde**

HHC, 11th Inf Bde
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf
1st Bn, 20th Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
Task Force 23d Cav (Prov)
Trp E, 1st Cav
Trp H, 17th Cav
59th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
31st PI Det
90th Chemical Det

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Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

327th Avn Det
Combat Weather Team 1

196th Infantry Brigade

HHC, 196th Inf Bde
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf
45th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
10th PI Det (Fld Svc)
27th Chemical Det

198th Infantry Brigade

HHC, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf
1st Bn, 52d Inf
57th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
87th Chemical Det
Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

23d Infantry Division Artillery

HHB, Div Arty
6th Bn, 11th Arty (105mm) (T)
1st Bn, 14th Arty (-) (105mm) (T)
3d Bn, 16th Arty (155mm) (T)
Btry D, 1st Bn, 82d Arty (8" /175mm) (SP)
3d Bn, 18th Arty (155mm) (T)
1st Bn, 82d Arty (-) (155mm) (T)
3d Bn, 82d Arty (105mm) (T)
Btry B (-), 1st Bn, 14th Arty (105mm) (T)
Btry G, 55th Arty (MG)
251 FA RAD Det
252 FA RAD Det
271 FA RAD Det

16th Combat Aviation Group

HHC, 16th CAG
14th Combat Avn Bn
71st Avn Co (Aslt Hel)
116th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) (OPCON)
132d Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
174th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
176th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
178th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
534th Med Det
756th Med Det
123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)
Trp D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav

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Trp F, 8th Cav
Co E, 723d Maint Bn
335th Trans Co
352d Avn Det

23d Infantry Division Support Command

HHC and Band
23d Med Bn
23d S&T Bn
723d Maint Bn (-)
23d Admin Co
635th MI Co
Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf
63d Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
23d Inf Combat Center (Prov)

Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division

HHC, 23d Inf Div
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)
Trp F, 17th Cav
26th Engr Bn
523d Sig Bn
COMSEC CONTACT Team #2
23d MP Co
300th MP Co
328th Radio Research Co
3d Mil Hist Det
OL 7, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

Non-Divisional Units

Det 3, 7th PSYOPS Bn (DS of Div)
USASSG, ACSI, DA

3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE

HQ, 3d MAB
5th CIT, FMF
1st Interpreter Tm
3d CIT, FMF
3d ITT, FMF
Det, HQ Bn, 1st Mar Div
Det, 1st Radio Bn, FMF
1st MP Bn, FMF
HQ Co (Rein), 1st Mar
1st Bn, 1st Regt
2d Bn, 1st Regt
3d Bn, 1st Regt
1st Bn (Rein), 11th Mar
Det, HQ Btry, 11th Mar
3d 8" How Btry, FMF

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Co A (Rein), 1st Recon Bn
Det, H&S Co, 1st Recon Bn
Det, HQ Co, 7th Engr Bn, FMF
Det, SVC Co, 7th Engr Bn, FMF
Co A (Rein), 1st Engr Bn
Det, H&S Co, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Engr Spt Co, 1st Engr Bn
Co A (Rein), 1st MT Bn
Det, H&S Co, 1st MT Bn
Co C, 1st Shore Party
Comm Spt Co (Rein), FMF
Det, 5th Comm Bn, FMF
Co A (Rein), 1st Med Bn
Det, 11th Dental Co
H&MS, 11th MARS
MABS - 11
VMA - 311
VMA (AW) - 225
Det, VMO - 6
Det, H&HS, 18
H&MS, 16 MABS (-)
MABS 16 (-)
HMM 16 (-)
HMM 263
HMM 463
HML 167
MATCU 68
Det, VMGR 152
2d CAG
FLC (Rein)

1ST BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH)

HHC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)
1st Bn, 11th Inf
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armor
3d Sqdn, 5th Arm Cav
5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (SP)
75th Spt Bn
Co P (Ranger), 75th Inf
Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav
Co A, 7th Engr Bn
298th Sig Co
43d Inf Plt (Set Dog)
77th Combat Tracker Det
86th Chemical Det

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48th PI Det (Fld Svc)
517th MI Det
407th Radio Research Det

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SITE MAP OF MILITARY REGION 1

LEGEND

Below listed sites are shown on MR 1 map by number as indicated:

<u>SITE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Fire Support Base A-4	1
Fire Support Base C-2	2
Fire Support Base C-1	3
Dong Ha Combat Center	4
Quang Tri Combat Center	5
Camp Carroll	6
Rock Pile	7
Fire Support Base Vandegrift	8
Mai Loc	9
Ca Lu	10
Lang Vei	11
Lao Bao	12
Fire Support Base Nancy	13
Fire Support Base Rakkasan	14
Fire Support Base Sally	15
Fire Support Base Gia Le	16
Fire Support Base Birmingham	17
Fire Support Base Bastogne	18
Fire Support Base Veghel	19

~~ENCLOSURE 2~~

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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Fire Support Base Anzio	20
Hill 65	21
Hill 52	22
Duc Duc District HQ and Village	23
Fire Support Base Ross	24
Fire Support Base Mary Ann	25
Fire Support Base Barbara	26
Fire Support Base Nac	27
Fire Support Base Rawhide	28

Hue-to-Da Nang Railroad ######

Vietnam - Laos Border — • — • —

Province Boundaries — — — — —

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
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
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
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